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SHORTER TEXT FROM THE BOOK – ATTENTION: SCREENED TEXT
NATIONAL LIBERATION WAR IN SLOVENIA 1941 – 1945
In almost every brigade or detachment, a company or battalion was formed, consisting of members of foreign nationalities, because the units of the 4th operational zone were joined by more than a thousand fighters, originally from the Soviet Union, Austria, Hungary, Poland and even from France. Defections to the partisans in the last months of the war were not rare even in the area of the 7th and 9th corps, but they were more numerous in the territory of the 4th operational zone, mainly because of the wider territorial distribution of the partisan units and the greater saturation of the territory of Styria and Carinthia with enemy rear units. which included many soldiers of non-German nationality. The headquarters of the zone ordered that international battalions should be formed from these anti-fascists everywhere, where there are many of them, and they should also be given combat tasks. We can conclude that the 4th operational zone, with the activity of its brigades and detachments, which were widely distributed throughout the territory from the Sava to the Mura (smaller partisan units were also formed in Haloze and Slovenske Gorice in April), caused a state of general uncertainty in the enemy’s rear. At every step and at every moment, the enemy expected a partisan attack, and he could only move along busy roads in a marching battle formation. Due to mining operations by partisan units and attacks by Yugoslav and allied air forces, the railway lines across northern Slovenia had very little capacity. Even the last line, which at the end of April still allowed traffic across Slovenian territory to the west into the heart of the Reich, the Dravograd-Celovec line, was severed near Kamno, southeast of Velikovac. Such a position in the rear was definitely very unfavorable for the German army group “E”, which at the beginning of April 1945 was still defending deep in the interior of Yugoslavia and which on April 12, when the 1st and 3rd Yugoslav armies broke through the front line in Srem and on the Drava, began to withdraw in order to deploy on a new defensive line along the Ilova River.
Penetration of the l., 2. and 3. ar- The main leader of the stubborn defense of the German group made JA against Slovenia and the “E” army under the command of Colonel General activity of units of the 4th operative – Alexandra von Lohra on the line Drava Stari Gradac-Bilo not the mountain zone-Veliki Zdencih, Ilova-Dubica-Bosanski Novi was to implement an orderly withdrawal of all units across Slovenia to Austrian territory. This was not easy, because there were few traffic connections and even these passed through the territory disturbed by the units of the 4th operational zone of the JA. This defensive line between the Drava and the Sava, which was defended by at least fourteen German, Ustasha and Home Guard divisions under the command of the German 21st Mountain Army Corps, was attacked by two Yugoslav armies: the third, which had eight divisions (12th, 16th, 17th ., 32nd, 33rd, 36th, 40th and 51st), on the Drava-Grubišno Polje front section, and the 1st Army with seven divisions (1st, 5th, 6th, 11th, 21st, 42nd . and 48.) on the Veliki Zdencir section. Sava. South of the Sava, the Una operational group of the 2nd Army (23rd, 25th, 28th, 39th and 45th divisions), its Karlovian operational group (3rd, 4th, 10th and 34th divisions) pushed across the Una towards Sisak ) was preparing to surround Karlovac from the western, southern and eastern sides, whose defense was led by the headquarters of the German 91st Army Corps, and then strike at Zagreb.
225 War of Liberation of the Nation of Yugoslavia, vol. 2, p. 623-626 .
With this counterattack, the enemy held back the advance of the Yugoslav 1st Army for several days and created better conditions for the gradual withdrawal, which he began on April 30. On the same day, the 1st Army launched a decisive attack on the enemy and, after fierce fighting, began a drive towards Zagreb on May 4. At the same time, the Third Army penetrated towards Varaždin. On May 4, units of its 16th and 17th divisions liberated Bjelovar, and the 36th and 51st divisions liberated Koprivnica the following day. On May 2, the Una operational group of the 2nd Army liberated the Una valley after fierce fighting and began to penetrate towards Sisak. Meanwhile, fierce fighting broke out near Karlovac as well. The Karloška operational group, which protected the flank of the 4th Army when it penetrated into Trieste, broke the last enemy resistance in the city only on May 7, even though Ozalj, for example, had already been liberated three days earlier. The enemy retreated from Karlovac towards Samobor and Brežice, because the places in the lower reaches of the Kolpa, Petrinja and Sisak, were already liberated on May 5 and 6. All three Yugoslav armies then continued their pursuit of the enemy even more decisively. On May 6, the Third Army broke through its defenses at Ludbreg, and the next day liberated Varaždin and Varaždinske Toplice. The 1st Army captured Čazma and Kutina and advanced towards Zagreb, while the 2nd Army pressed towards the same goal from the south and towards Brežice and Novi Mesto. After fierce fighting at Velika Gorica, it managed to cross the Sava, and on May 8, both armies liberated the capital of Croatia, Zagreb. 226 In order to prepare an orderly withdrawal of troops through Slovenia to Carinthia, the headquarters of the German Army Group “E” had already sent several corps headquarters to its deeper rear. First, the headquarters of the 34th Army Corps arrived in Ljubljana. Since he did not have the necessary forces, he could not do anything to liberate the 97th Corps surrounded at Ilirska Bistrica. Then he was transferred to Beljak, and the headquarters of the 91st Army Corps, which led the battles at Karlovac, was supposed to go to Ljubljana. But in the face of the changed situation, he had to retreat towards Zidane most and never arrived in Ljubljana. First, the headquarters of the 69th Army Corps was sent to eastern Carinthia, which, together with the headquarters of the 34th Corps, was supposed to organize a defense line in the Karavanki and along the Italian border (“Kernfestung Alpen”), and then the headquarters of the 15th Mountain Corps, which did not arrive to Carinthia. At the same time, the headquarters of Army Group “E” began to prepare a new command post in Borovlje, and on the 5th moved to a temporary command post in Polzela near Celje in May, from where he was to lead the withdrawal of the main part of his troops across Slovenia to Carinthia. 227 Despite the capitulation of the German armed forces in northern Italy (May 2), in northwestern Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark (May 5), western Austria and Bavaria (May 6), and near-term preparations for a general capitulation on one and Hitler’s suicide and fall Berlin, on the other hand, was still persistently defended by enemy units on the central Yugoslav battlefield. Hoping to make a fully organized retreat, they relied on improvised defensive lines, but they could only retreat gradually. They also showed no intention of negotiating a ceasefire. They wanted to avoid Yugoslavian and Soviet captivity by any means possible and surrender to Anglo-American troops. 228 We must mention that the Chetnik units fleeing from Montenegro and Bosnia, as well as the Ustasha and Home Guard units of the Independent State of Croatia, which was disintegrating under the blows of the liberation forces, retreated with the occupier. Part of these units and their groups tried to hide in the mountains, where they were supposed to wait for a more favorable time when, as they hoped, the intervention of the Western allies in Yugoslavia would occur. Of course, the headquarters of the Yugoslav armies had to allocate a part of their forces to the pursuit of such groups.
226 Ibid., p. 626-631. 227 Tone Ferenc, The last days of the war in Stovensko, Our defense, no. 6, June 1970, p. 12. 228 Second World War, Review of War Operations, vol. 5, p. 383-389.
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At the same time as the occupier’s and Quisling’s columns, groups of civilians, some with their families, also moved westward. Among them there were many who were blinded by the enemy’s propaganda, and quite a few of them; who tarnished themselves with anti-national acts. They had to share their fate with the occupier because they were afraid of the popular judgment in their place. When the fighting began near Ljubljana on May 7, and the following day the divisions of the JA Motorized Detachment appeared in the Sava Dolinka valley, the entire Army Group “E” was already in a really difficult situation. For its retreat to Austria, it had only a passage across the Mislinjska dolina and along the road Šoštanj-Sv. Vid-Črna, because the crossings north of Maribor were designated for the retreat of the units of the 2nd Tank Army, which until then defended the front along the Mur. Narrow and bad roads and only one single-track railway, which was still interrupted, were a serious inhibiting factor. Due to the partisan activity, the enemy was unable to implement the necessary transport, accommodation and supply measures, which would have enabled him to quickly move units across Slovenian territory. Therefore, the columns fell behind and piled up. There was more and more confusion. Namely, on May 2, 1945, when the main staff of the JA for Slovenia learned about the surrender of the German armed forces in northern Italy, it ordered the headquarters of the 4th operational zone that the main body of the 14th division from the area of Smrekovac, where it was located, should immediately move towards Carinthia and its the main centers, Klagenfurt and Beljak. The Carinthian and Kokrishna detachments are also expected to go there. The same order was issued on the same day by the Commander-in-Chief of JA Josip Broz-Tito. The headquarters of the 4th operational zone decided that the closest brigades (1st, 2nd and 13th) and both detachments should rush to Carinthia, while the 6th and 11th brigades should move to Šaleška valley. The Kamnik-Zasavia detachment, in cooperation with the National Defense units, should liberate the Trbovel mining basin, while the Lackov and Kozjan detachments should each have their own operational area, that is, the area north of Maribor and the Drava valley up to Dravograd, or the area east of Celje. The headquarters of the zone also issued instructions to the subordinate units on how to act in the final operations to liberate the land. 229 When the main body of the 14th division moved towards Slovenian Carinthia, the 6th “Slavka Šlandra” brigade, the 11th “Miloš Zidanška” brigade and the battalion of the 3rd National Defense Brigade decided to help the Kamnik-Zasavia detachment. In Zagorje, the crew from the railway line security regiment, which consisted mostly of Austrians, showed a willingness to surrender to the National Liberation Army. The operational headquarters of the two brigades, which was immediately rebuilt, intended to use this to liberate the Sava Valley from Zidane Most to Litija. Such a success would greatly facilitate the operations of the 7th Corps against Ljubljana and prevent enemy movements towards Gorenjska. But the almost concluded agreement on the surrender of the entire regiment was realized only with regard to the crew in Zagorje, in the face of the hesitation of the Austrian officers. On the 5 The two brigades were strengthened numerically and received a lot of weapons. Zagorje, a conscious working-class settlement of Revirje, was the first major place to be liberated by the 4th operational zone in the final operations, and the Zagorje posada was the first major unit in central Slovenia to surrender. Two days later, due to enemy pressure from the direction of Trbovelj, the units of the zone had to withdraw from Zagorje after fierce fighting, but on May 9, 1945, it was finally free. 230
229 Proceedings VI/19, doc. no. 123. 230 Miroslav Stiplovšek, Šlandrov’s brigade, p. 679-687; Mirko Fajdiga, Zidanškova brigade, p. 672-683.
The headquarters of the 4th operational zone ordered that the three brigades of the 14th division, which had the task of going to Carinthia, should first attack and destroy the enemy outposts in Dravograd and Črna. He expected that the enemy was already demoralized and that at least one brigade of the division with confiscated motor vehicles would be able to move quickly towards Klagenfurt after the destruction of the enemy outposts. But both outposts were extremely important points on the route of the intended withdrawal of German troops from Yugoslavia, so they were strongly fortified and defended themselves resolutely. On May 4, Šercer’s brigade tried in vain to enter the bunkers and wire barriers of the Dravograd post and could not break through to the left bank of the Drava, while the garrison in Črna also withstood the pressure of Tomšić’s brigade on the night of May 5. The following night, the brigades of the main body of the 14th Division simultaneously attacked the enemy outposts in Črna, Crane and Boilers. They managed to expel the enemy from Žerjavo. The main headquarters of the JA for Slovenia ordered that the division should not waste time with useless running into fortifications that it would not be able to meet, but that it should immediately go to the Austrian part of Slovenian Carinthia. On the basis of this order, the Ž31 brigades launched attacks and on May 7 moved through the valley of Koprivna and Lepena towards Železna Kapla. Faced with the employment of two brigades at Zagorje, the strength and armament of the main body of the 14th Division were definitely too weak to be able to close the Dravograd exit from Slovenia to Carinthia already in the first days of May. However, the presence of the 14th Division at Železna Kapla, where it engaged in fighting with the German 14th SS Division “Galizien” on May 8, made it impossible for enemy units to retreat unhindered from Gorenjska across Jezerska. On that day, Carinthia was the only Austrian province that had not yet been occupied by troops from other armies of the anti-fascist coalition. The Fourteenth Division was the first major unit of the Allied forces to set foot on its soil. We have already mentioned that on May 5, the main headquarters of the Slovak Army for Slovenia directed the two brigades that were near Zagorje to cooperate even more closely in the liberation of Ljubljana. But when it was clear that the enemy would stop defending it, on May 8 Šlandrov’s and Zidanšek’s brigades also headed towards the Upper Savinjska Valley in order to go to Carinthia. Between May 4 and 6, units of the zone repeatedly interrupted the Celje Dravograd, Dravograd-Prevalje and Dravograd-Maribor railway lines and also demolished several buildings on the roads leading to Carinthia. Clashes that hindered the movements of enemy columns also occurred elsewhere. On May 7, units of the battalion of the 3rd Brigade of the National Defense, which relied on Pohorje in its activities, liberated Slovenska Konjica and captured around six hundred enemy soldiers, but had to retreat to Konjiška gora before the enemy’s superiority. In these days of the approaching end of the enemy’s violence, smaller partisan units, the National Guard and the team of courier stations, as well as groups of armed activists of the liberation movement, clashed with the enemy and thus hindered his movements, so that he could not move safely even on the main roads. if he did not insure himself well. Thus, a group of 50 men under the leadership of Pohor intelligence center officers, reinforced by armed members of the economic commission of the Maribor district, attacked the Ustasha column near the village of Morje between Slovensko Bistrica and Maribor. They expected that the leading Ustasha criminals were in this column. At first, the Ustashi were surprised, but because they were superior, they repelled the attack. On the following day, May 8, the Ustashi leadership column, which was retreating from Zagreb across Rogaška Slatina, managed to escape unhindered to Carinthia via Maribor, but was captured on May 10 by Lake Vrb, about 10 km west of Klagenfurt. attacked the Ustasha column near the village of Morje between Slovensko Bistrica and Maribor. They expected that the leading Ustasha criminals were in this column. At first, the Ustashi were surprised, but because they were superior, they repelled the attack. On the following day, May 8, the Ustashi leadership column, which was retreating from Zagreb across Rogaška Slatina, managed to escape unhindered to Carinthia via Maribor, but was captured on May 10 by Lake Vrb, about 10 km west of Klagenfurt. attacked the Ustasha column near the village of Morje between Slovensko Bistrica and Maribor. They expected that the leading Ustasha criminals were in this column. At first, the Ustashi were surprised, but because they were superior, they repelled the attack. On the following day, May 8, the Ustashi leadership column, which was retreating from Zagreb across Rogaška Slatina, managed to escape unhindered to Carinthia via Maribor, but was captured on May 10 by Lake Vrb, about 10 km west of Klagenfurt. All over the territory of Styria, the occupying institutions, rear units and individuals of its apparatus were gripped by the conviction of an imminent collapse. They started running disorganized. The roads were crowded with trucks, cars, wagons, bicycles and pedestrians who were trying to leave Slovenia as soon as possible. Activists of the Liberation Front, however
231 Proceedings VI/19, doc. no. 123, 129, 135 and 154. 232 Tone Ferenc, The last days of the war in Slovenia, Our defense, no. 6, June 1970, p. 7.
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even conscious people under their leadership, where there were no national liberation units, tried to do as much as possible for the final victory over the occupier. In this regard, it is particularly necessary to emphasize the high level of awareness of the Slovenian railway and postal staff, who immediately and by and large began to conscientiously comply with the instructions of the partisan fighters and activists. Although the front line of the three Yugoslav armies was still on Croatian territory, the situation in northern Slovenia actually already enabled the army units to advance quickly and decisively into the interior of Slovenian territory, especially on the flanks, and in cooperation with the units of the 4th operational zone, it made it possible to created wide encircling rings to capture the enemy. But at the same time, this situation was also unclear to the army headquarters, because they did not have pre-organized direct communications, especially radio communications with the units of the 4th operational zone, which were in the enemy’s rear. There were no federal zone officers in any of the invading army headquarters who had the necessary wireless means of communication with which to maintain constant contact and with whom the army headquarters could issue orders to the zone units according to current battlefield needs. Until now, close direct operational and tactical cooperation was possible only when the units of the armies reached during their advance the area where the units of the zone were operating and when they came into contact with them. Until then, they coordinated their activities with the activities of the armies based on their own assessment of the situation and on the orders of the members of the headquarters of the 4th operational zone, who went to the most important sections of the battlefield and tried to direct their activities in accordance with the set goals.
In Carinthia Penetration of the main body of the 14th division of the 4th operational zone through the valley of Koprivna and Lepena to the area of Želez not Kapla, the JA Motorized Detachment to the western part of the Carinthian territory, and the Jeseníko-Bohinj, Kokrška and Carinthian Detachments to the northern foothills of the Karavanki had a double smort. On the one hand, these units were supposed to form the northern part of the wide ring of the Yugoslav liberation forces, which was supposed to force the entire German occupation army, retreating at the same time as the domestic traitors from Yugoslavia, to capitulate on Yugoslav soil, and on the other hand, with their presence manifested to the great allies of the anti-Hitler coalition the will of the Slovenian nation that the places inhabited by Slovenians belong to Slovenia and Yugoslavia and that the future fair borders between the two countries should be drawn in such a way that all Slovenian national territory is part of the free mother country of Slovenia, which is part of the new of Yugoslavia. But the Nazi Carinthian Gauleiter dr. With the aim of making it easier for the Western allies to occupy Carinthia, and at the same time making it more difficult for Yugoslav troops to occupy Slovenian territory, Friedrich Rainer agreed to the request of the leaders of some old Austrian political parties to hand over power to them before his resignation. The provisional regional government of Carinthia, which took power from him on May 8, primarily set itself the task of preserving the indivisibility of Carinthia and protecting former Nazis. Although s demonstrated its practical policy that it was the child and heir of the Nazi regime, the military units of the Western Allies, which were arriving on the territory of Carinthia, began to rely on its authorities, referring at the same time to the assurances of the three great powers about the restoration of Austria as an independent state . 233 The Slovenian national liberation units therefore had one more opponent in Carinthia, as the authorities of the provisional Carinthian provincial government negotiated with the commanders of nearby German military units in order to keep the national liberation army as far away from the main centers as possible. While the German troops surrendered to the British units as soon as they came into contact with them, the Yugoslav national liberation units waited in battle formation positions and engaged in fighting with them. When the 14th Division started from the area of Železna Kapla, it had to deal with the divisions of the German 14th SS Division “Galizien”, retreating from Upper Styria and deployed on the line Žitara ves – Sinča ves. In three places, the division tried to break through the German positions in order to continue the march towards Klagenfurt. These skirmishes kept its main body at least for a day, As we have already mentioned, on the afternoon of May 8, almost at the same time as the troops of the British army, the first division of the Yugoslav liberation forces, the Kokrški detachment and part of the Carinthian detachment, and then the Motorized detachment of the 4th Army, arrived in Cologne. The Jesenice-Bohinj detachment also came through Karavanke, which then went to Ziljska dolina in western Carinthia. With this development of events, the headquarters of the 4th operational zone believed that the brigades of the 14th division should be deployed in such a way that they would manifest the presence of the Yugoslav liberation forces in all places inhabited by Slovenes. Bračić’s brigade went to Borovlje, Šercer’s to Velikovec, and Tomšić’s to Sinča. They began to disarm the units of the German army, which in the meantime, on the night of May 9, 1945, unconditionally capitulated. 234 A situation full of contradictions arose in Carinthia. There were still many units of the collapsing German army and satellite troops in the country, who wanted to be captured by the British as soon as possible. They were disarmed by the British and Yugoslav units, although the British military command respected the Yugoslav units as allies, it was soon felt that they were trying to limit their activity in various ways, and to keep all the key positions in their hands, waiting only for the moment when they could use the situation to your advantage. The Slovenian population enthusiastically and lovingly welcomed the Slovenian Liberation Army and helped it as much as they could, in the open hope that their native land, now that Nazism had been destroyed, would nevertheless become part of free Slovenia.
233 right there: 234 Proceedings VI/19, doc. no. 135 and 154.
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In view of the general capitulation of the German armed forces and the end of the Second World War in Europe, the fighting in Slovenia after May 9 had the character of operations aimed at capturing the bulk of the occupation-Quisling army on Yugoslav soil, while at the same time the forces of the Yugoslav counter-revolution, fleeing with the occupier, strike the final blow before they could withdraw into areas already penetrated by troops of the Western powers. The Quislings expected that the right-wing circles of the western countries would at least protect them from Yugoslav captivity, if their troops did not occupy the northwestern part of Yugoslavia. The struggle after May 9 therefore became a struggle for the defense of the revolution and the self-determination of the Slovenian nation, for the victory of the people’s power on the entire national territory and for a truly victorious conclusion of the four-year war of national liberation,
The narrowing of the ring around the heads- When the provisions of unconditional capitulation came into force not German groups in Slo- of all the German armed forces, were Yugoslavian venous. Liberation of the Mari- 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies still on Croatian territory. bora and Ptuj After the liberation of Zagreb, Varaždin and other larger towns cleared their hinterland of German and Ustasha groups and at the same time pushed hundreds of thousands of enemy troops into the interior of Slovenia. As the general withdrawal of the German Army Group “E” did not begin until May 8, on the day of the capitulation the forward divisions of its retreating large units were barely in the vicinity of the Brick Bridge and Celje, while the main body was still east of the Celje railway- Zidani Most. The units of the 22nd Corps of the 2nd Tank Army and units of the Hungarian Army, which until then defended themselves in the territory between the Mura and the Drava, were somewhat more punctual. Already on May 8, they managed to retreat completely across the passes north and northeast of Maribor to the Austrian soil of Upper Styria, fearing that they would not be able to slip through the mountain passes in Austria in time to the territory occupied by the British troops. As a result of such a rapid retreat of the enemy troops, favorable conditions were created north of the Drava for the unimpeded advance of the 12th and 16th divisions of the Bulgarian 1st Patriotic Front Army, which until then had been stationary for several weeks on the already mentioned Razkrižje-Ormož line. Along the Mura, across Ljutomer towards Gornja Radgona, across Št. Lenart towards Cmurek and along the Drava across Ptuj and Maribor, the Bulgarian units moved in three basic columns towards the northern border of Slovenia without encountering any stronger enemy resistance. 235 Immediately after the retreat of the enemy troops and mostly before the arrival of the Bulgarian columns, groups of armed activists, partisan troops, which had already been formed by the organs of the liberation movement, or partisan guards formed during the upheaval days rushed to the larger settlements of Slovenske gorice and Prlekije. The organs of the people’s government and the Liberation Front immediately began to function. In some places, these troops marched into the centers at the same time as the Bulgarian army. Here, we must mention that some Bulgarian troops behaved on Slovenian territory as if they were not on the territory of Yugoslavia. The authorities of the people often had to intervene, because there were many cases of violent confiscation of people’s property, disregard of the decisions of national liberation committees and even rough treatment of the population. When the SNOS delegation in Murska Sobota found out about the withdrawal of the enemy from the territory between the Mura and the Drava, realizing that there were no major units of the 4th operational zone there, it issued an order for the Prekmurska Brigade to move to that territory immediately. Her column, which numbered around 1,900 well-armed men, was still in front of the Bulgarian troops in Ljutomer on the afternoon of May 8, and the next day in Ptuj, where the advance guards of the Bulgarian units were already arriving. After the meeting of the two columns at Dornava, a company of this brigade remained in Ptuj, which the Germans left on the evening of May 8, as a garrison, while the rest of the brigade continued its march towards Maribor. On the same day, May 9, the 51st Division of the Yugoslav 3rd Army also crossed the Drava near Stojnci and in the evening penetrated to Ptuj, in order to continue the march towards Maribor the next day. 236 The German occupier was preparing the demolition of some important buildings in Maribor on the night of May 9. Even in the vicinity of Maribor, there were no large national liberation units that could break into the city and prevent the destruction of buildings during the days of the enemy’s retreat. This task was successfully completed by partisan informants, party members and activists, who rushed to the town from nearby towns and from Pohorje on May 9 to help those who were in it. On the evening of May 8, even before he was completely free and before the first Bulgarian scouts, a group of officers came to Maribor and were tasked by the main staff of JA for Slovenia to form a commando of the city. It traveled from Črnomlje via Biograd na Moru and by plane to Belgrade, and then to the 3rd Army and made its way forward past the Bulgarian columns. She started work immediately. On the same evening, the 3rd and 5th battalions of the 3rd National Defense Brigade arrived in the city, followed by the Prekmurska Brigade, followed by the 51st Division of the 3rd Army, in the night of May 10. Upon liberation, new units began to be formed, from which the Maribor Brigade was formed. Its fighters gradually took over the security of buildings, traffic and prisoner-of-war camps, as both battalions of the National Defense were unable to complete all tasks.237 Because the German 15th Cavalry Cossack Corps, which had two cavalry divisions and one infantry Cossack brigade, was able to quickly retreat across Maribor on horseback
235 Boro Mitrovski, Ph.D. Venceslav Glišić, Tomo Ristovski, Bulgarian Army in Yugoslavia 1941-1945, Slovenian edition, p. 260. 236 Mitja Hribovšek, Prekmurska brigade, p. 109-143. 237 Thanks to the KPS district committee and the OF committee, 20,000 copies of the proclamation “Maribor is free” were secretly printed in the Maribor printing house. He appeared on the streets on May 9, 1945, at the same time as the first liberators.
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and Dravograd to Austria, while the German so-called Fischer battle group was retreating across Slovenska Bistrica and Konjice towards the Šaleška Valley, there was also a gap in front of the 36th, 12th and 40th divisions of the 3rd Army. They quickly penetrated across the eastern part of Haloz and Ptujska polje. The units of these divisions stopped in the area of Maribor and sent part of their forces towards Št. Iliju (now Šentilj) in Slovenske gorice and Lipnica. The liberation of Ptuj and Maribor was operationally extremely important, as the bulk of the German Army Group “E” and the traitorous Ustasha-Chetnik units had only the exit through the Mislinjska Valley available to retreat to Austria. If the Yugoslav liberation forces succeed in sealing off this only exit, the units of the German occupier and his helpers will have to surrender on Yugoslav soil. It was therefore necessary to quickly capture the two bridges in Dravograd and prevent the further movement of enemy troops into Austria. Already on May 10, the 2nd battalion of the Prekmurska brigade first set off from Maribor, namely by train, which was hastily assembled. The next day, 1l. in May, as well as the 6th brigade of the 36th division. 238 In the meantime, the events that marked the end of the Nazi occupation of Slovenia unfolded with lightning speed in other sections of the strategic ring. After fierce fighting south of Novi Marof, the 16th and 17th Divisions of the 3rd Army began to penetrate the hilly terrain on both sides of the Zabok-Krapina-Rogatec railway line on May 9. Two days later, the 16th Division clashed with a strong Ustasha group near the village of Podplat, defeated it and mostly captured it, while the 17th Division penetrated towards Slovenska Bistrica. South of the aforementioned divisions, up to Podsused near Zagreb, the 1st Army was gradually deploying for the penetration into Slovenia, which on May 8 and 9 was still heavily occupied by the fighting north of Zagreb, but the very next day it was in the Sotle valley, between Klanjec and the village of Dekmanca, disarmed the German 41st Division. It penetrated across Kozjanska towards Celje and Sv. Juri (now Šentjur) near Celje and disarmed enemy groups. Divisions of the 2nd Army were closing the southern part of the ring. On their left wing, they were in operational contact with the units of the 7th Corps, the main part of which was directed towards
238 Mitja Hribovšek, Prekmurska brigade, p. 170-173.
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Ljubljana. After the liberation of Zagreb, the headquarters of the 2nd Army directed the 45th and 39th divisions across Kozjanska towards Celje, the 4th division along the Sava across Brežice and Krška, and the 3rd division across Novo mesto towards Zidane most. The latter should then turn towards Gorenjska. Other divisions of this army remained in the rear as a reserve. Since the enemy withdrew from the territory on the right bank of the Sava, the 3rd Division arrived in Novo mesto on May 8, and the 10th Division arrived in Krška the next day. 239 Units of the 4th operational zone operated inside the ring. When its Headquarters, which was in Topolšica that day, heard on the radio on the night of May 9 that the German forces had capitulated, towards morning he ordered the part of his protective battalion, which he had on hand, to take favorable positions at Šoštanje stopped a column of enemy troops that were retreating along the Celje-Velenje road towards Carinthia. The column was stopped only by determined fire and casualties fell on both sides. Finally, the headquarters of the 4th operational zone contacted the command of the column and demanded the immediate surrender and handing over of the weapons. The units that were at Šoštanje began to surrender. Negotiations between the headquarters of the 4th operational zone JA and the commander of the German army group “E”, Colonel-General Alexander von Lohr, took place only in the afternoon of the same day, namely with the intervention of the political commissar of the 14th division, Ivan Dolničar, who is 6. and 1 l. led the brigade across the Savinjska valley towards Carinthia. ~tab of the German army group “E” in Polzela, who was aware of the difficulty of retreating such large, top of this still halted columns along a single road, and the announcement of the capitulation of all the armed forces of the Third Reich overtook him even before he brought his units to Carinthia ; he decided, when he lost contact with his units near Šoštanje, to find contact with the Yugoslav army himself and start negotiations on a ceasefire. he hoped At the interviews in Letuš on the afternoon of May 9, he agreed that he would first issue an order to his subordinates to stop all retreating columns, while negotiations on the disarmament and surrender of the units would continue at the headquarters of the 4th operational zone in Topolšica. 240 On the night of May 10, the commander of Army Group “E” signed an act in Topolšica on the surrender of all his units to the Yugoslav Liberation Forces and issued an order to remain in their positions. Some German units began to surrender immediately, while others left only heavy weapons and equipment and, especially if there were no larger liberation units nearby, tried to move as close as possible to Carinthia. However, the orders to stay put and surrender were mainly ignored by the Ustasha and Chetnik units. There were also fierce clashes with them. Of course, the surrender was only possible when stronger units of the Yugoslav forces were present. In the extreme south of the ring, on May 11, the main body of the 7th SS Division and the headquarters of the 91st Army Corps laid down their arms near the Brick Bridge, and the day before, the 373rd Legionary Division “Tiger” laid down their arms at Raka near Krško. In the disarmament operation, the divisions of the 2nd Army were also assisted by one battalion each from the Kamnik-Zasavia detachment and the Kozjan detachment, which held the enemy columns back with ambushes on the roads and heights. With the liberation of Zidane most and Laško in the south, the two arms of the large encircling pincers of the Yugoslav Army, which in Carinthia consisted of the units of the 4th operational zone and the Motorized Detachment of the 4th Army, in the north and northeast of the division of the 3rd Army, in the east and south l . and the 2nd Armies, and in the west the units of the 7th Corps, which closed the passage over Trojane and liberated Kamnik, had already narrowed so much that
239 War of Liberation of the Nation of Yugoslavia, vol. 2, p. 630-634; Final operations for the liberation of Yugoslavia 1944-1945, p. 706-724. 240 Dušan Uzelac, The Great Spring Offensive of the Polish Army 1945, Battle, April 30, May 1 and 2, 1975; Petar Brajović, The operation that moved Victory Day, Delo, 30 April 1975.
the enemy army had very little room for maneuver. It covered only the wider area of Celje and a narrow strip along the Savinjska, Šaleška and Mislinjska valleys.
Capture of enemy units in the wider area of Celje
All the enemy columns, which had not yet been able to withdraw, were now flocking to the wider area of Celje. Of course, the headquarters of the liberation forces directed their units to this important area, because the enemy had to be stopped as deep as possible in the interior of Slovenian territory. When in the upper part of the Savinja Valley, near Braslovče and Radmir, they disarmed some of the fastest columns of the German 21st and 91st Army Corps, the 6th and 11th! the brigade of the 4th operational zone, which were in Ljubno (now Ljubno ob Savinja) and Radmir, decided to send them towards Celje. The district committee of the OF and the KPS committee of Celje already on the night of May 9, in accordance with the instructions given by the ruling committee of the KPS for Styria, started discussions on the surrender of the German garrison and the establishment of political authority. The next morning, the entire city was decorated with Slovenian and Yugoslav flags. The units of the German garrison surrendered in accordance with the announced capitulation, but it was different with the Ustasha units, whose headquarters had been in the city since May 7. They were even insolent and did not even want to hear about capitulation, but they avoided open confrontations, precisely in their desire to enable a quick march towards Carinthia. The representative of the headquarters of the 4th operational zone immediately attracted part of the Kozjan and Kamnik-Zasavia detachments to Celje. They decided to quickly close the routes to the Celje basin. The first battalion of the Kozjan detachment captured Štore and began shelling the Ustasha column coming from the direction of Rogaška Slatina. It retreated first higher into the hills, and then towards Vojnik, in order to make its way into the Mislinjska dolina, while the soldiers of the German division laid down their weapons and disarmed and marched forward in a disciplined manner. Celje was also invaded by part of l. battalion of the 3rd National Defense Brigade. The battalion of the Kamnik-Zasavia detachment set up ambushes at Sv. Petru (now Šempeter in the Savinjska valley) and Latkova village, and other sections of this detachment south of Celje towards Laško. At all entrances around the city, there were occasional shootings with Ustasha groups,242 Considering the huge number of various enemy units in the area of Celje, it was obvious that the few units of the detachments and the National Defense could not control the situation. The headquarters of the 4th operational zone ordered both brigades to go to Celje with the trucks they had confiscated from the enemy. Šlandrov’s brigade was to reinforce the forces disarming the enemy columns in Celje, and Zidanškov’s was to continue its journey to Maribor and further to Dravograd in order to strengthen the blockade there. On May 10, their columns slowly made their way to Celje, past the endless tired columns of the defeated. The troops of both detachments and the National Defense brigade mainly devoted themselves to securing buildings, warehouses and the prisoner of war camp. Šlandrova went to positions along the roads leading from Celje, and Zidanško’s brigade set off with trucks across Slovenske Konjice to Maribor. 243 On the order of members of the SNOS delegation, a battalion of the Prekmur Brigade was also sent to Celje from free Maribor. He boarded a train and traveled with it to Ponikva, where he learned that Grobelno had been occupied by the Ustashi. The battalion attacked them. After a short skirmish, the Ustasha group surrendered, and the battalion continued on May 11
241 Final operations for the liberation of Yugoslavia 1944-1945, p. 706-724. 242 Tone Ferenc, The last days of the war in Slovenia, Naša obramba, No. 6, June 1970, pp. 14-15. 243 Miroslav Stiplovšek, Šlandrov’s brigade, p. 687-693; Mirko Fajdiga, Zidanškova brigade, p. 685-689.
996, 997
wave ride by train to the Štore station, and by truck to Celje the next day. He strengthened the positions near the village of Zagrad because they expected the arrival of strong enemy forces from the direction of the Brick Bridge. Later, he disarmed enemy soldiers and guarded a prison camp. 244 Between May 9 and 12, impenetrable enemy columns rolled through Celje and along the roads in its surroundings day and night towards the Mislinjska Valley. Some were not yet disarmed. There were too few forces to stop them, take their weapons and put them in prison camps. There were skirmishes here and there, if a column making its way along the side paths encountered a weaker ambush. Realizing that her position was difficult, Čse obeyed orders, otherwise she sought a new way. Partisan commanders also sent some large units that they could not disarm across Trojane towards Domžale, where they were then disarmed by units of the 15th Division of the 7th Corps or the 3rd Division of the 2nd Army, which headed towards Gorenjska from Zidane Most. Finally, on the morning of May 12, the 11th Division of the 1st Army penetrated the area of Celje, followed by its 5th Division in the middle of the afternoon. The first, together with the 16th Division of the 3rd Army, which penetrated further north towards Vojnik and Slovenske Konjice, disarmed the German 11th Airborne Division, the 22nd and 181st Infantry Divisions, the headquarters of the 21st Army Corps and the 369th Legionary Division. In the cooperation of the 16th, 5th, 39th and 45th divisions, the first three were finally stopped in the Savinjska Valley and from there went to Yugoslavia as prisoners of war, while the last one managed to break through to Carinthia with an accelerated march, where it surrendered to the British troops. On May 11, Fischer’s battle group also laid down its arms in front of the units of the 17th Division of the 3rd Army. 245 The activity of the units of the 4th operational zone was also very successful in the wider area of Celje. It could be seen that the units of the 4th operational zone are together with the activists
244 Mitja Hribovšek, Prekmurska brigade, p. 143-162. 245 Final operations for the liberation of Yugoslavia 1944-1945, p. 706-724.
OF and KPS organizations established the national liberation authority and prevented many demolitions and destruction of public property. Many enemy units were partially disarmed and others were stopped with roadblocks, thus allowing the large units of the Yugoslav Army to make up for lost time and catch up. Although their numbers were not such that they could put a huge number of disarmed German soldiers and Ustaša-Chetnik units into prison camps, but with their activity they generously helped the divisions of the Yugoslav armies to disarm them one by one and capture them on Slovenian soil :h. By blocking the Savinje valley between Laško and Celje, for example, they decisively contributed to the capture of enemy units in the wider area of Zidane most, with their activity in Celje, near Štore and Grobelno and in the Upper Savinjska Valley, they enabled the capture of large units of the German 21st Corps. The fact that the enemy could no longer retreat in an orderly manner was mainly due to the units of the 4th operational zone in the territory that the divisions of the Yugoslav armies had not yet reached. The events around Celje also made it possible in time for a strong barrier to be formed near Dravograd, which tightly closed the exits from Yugoslavia to the remaining enemy troops.
The last battles in Slovenia Taking advantage of the favorable position of Dravograd to close the route ground in the Second World War to the retreating enemy troops, the headquarters of the 4th operational zone and the 14th division sent two battalions of the 1st shock brigade “Toneta Tomšič” to Dravograd already on May 10. In the evening, the 2nd battalion of the Prekmur brigade arrived there by train from Maribor. Both battalions from Tomšičev disarmed enemy groups on the Drava bridges. A column of the Bulgarian Patriotic Front army also arrived in the city that day. But the enemy, especially the Quisling units, did not want to surrender when crossing the bridges, but wanted to force their way through with weapons. When the 2nd Battalion of the Prekmurska Brigade arrived on the battlefield by train, there were fierce clashes around the railway station in order to retake the starting positions for the breakthrough across the bridges. The Bulgarians did not intervene with their cannons from the left bank of the Drava until the morning of May 11. It was soon clear that the forces defending the bridges were too weak. Therefore, on the night of May 12, at the initiative of members of the staff of the 4th operational zone and military representatives in the SNOS delegation, the 6th brigade of the 36th division of the 3rd army arrived in Dravograd. It occupied the Otiški vrh-Dravograd-Vič line, and on the same day, the main units of the 51st Division arrived by train. Its 7th brigade strengthened the defense on the line Otiški vrh-Tolsti vrh, and the 8th brigade occupied the line Stražiški vrh (angle 721)-Breznica Kovšak nad Poljano. Later, the headquarters of the 3rd Army sent the 12th Proletarian Brigade of the 12th Division towards Dravograd, the headquarters of Tomšič’s brigade with two battalions moved to Ravne, and one set up an ambush on the Dravograd-Pliberk road.246 On the night of May 12, a group of responsible officials of the KPS Central Committee, the Slovenian government and the main staff of the Slovak Republic for Slovenia left Ljubljana for Styria and Carinthia in order to coordinate the work of the headquarters of the Yugoslav armies penetrating through Slovenia with the units of the 4th operational zone as much as possible. and directed the work of the KPS and OF authorities in agreement with the goal of capturing the German army group “E” and continuing the national liberation struggle in Slovenian Carinthia. They went through Topolšica to Koroška, and part to Maribor. Almost at the same time, at noon on May 12, the advance guard of the 17th division, which we have already mentioned as penetrating across Vitanje from the direction of Slovenske Konjice, reached Zgornji
246 Tone Ferenc, The last days of the war in Slovenia, Our defense, no. 6, June 1970, p. 15; Mitja Hribovšek, Prekmurska Brigade, p. 165-192.
998, 999
Decent. She encountered the Ustashas and attacked them. Fighting continued in these positions until May 14, when a general attack on the encircled enemy group began. On May 12, the 4th brigade of the 5th division, which penetrated from the Zgornja Savinjska valley across the Mozirske planina, closed the already very narrow ring from the southern side. In total, there were more Yugoslav units than three divisions. Occasional skirmishes near Dravograd continued, even though surrender talks were taking place at the same time. Yugoslav representatives demanded the immediate laying down of arms and surrender, while the opposing side still hoped to achieve the possibility of passing into the captivity of British troops. It appears that on the night of May 12, the German and Quisling forces were still counting on her with certainty, that in the next few days they will make their way across the Yugoslav state border into Austria, if not at Dravograd, then along the Meža valley across Poljana towards Pliberk. That this was a broader plan can also be concluded from the fact that the captured commander of the German Army Group “E”, Colonel General Alexander von Lohr, who signed the act of surrender of his army on May 9 in Topolšica, took advantage of carelessness in guarding the prisoners and the absence of larger units and fled towards Carinthia at the head of the still unarmed column of the 104th Fighter Division. This column left Šoštanje on May 12 around 1 p.m. along the road across Zavodnje, Sv. Vid, Črna and Mežica, which the headquarters of the 4th operational zone had fixed the day before for the movement of some of the headquarters units and sections of the headquarters to Velikovec. Lohr and a group of officers managed to get to Poljana through the Tomšič brigade’s prison and settled in Bistrica near Pliberk on May 13 under the protection of British troops, while the column of the 104th fighter division and other units remained in the Meža valley and initially refused to surrender. Only on May 13, after three quarters of an hour of intense fire by the fighters of Tomšič’s brigade, who controlled the crossroads near Poljana (around 250 enemy soldiers fell in the battle), this column began to surrender. Around 3,000 soldiers of this division and other units surrendered. 247
247 Proceedings VI/19, doc. no. 151 and 154.
This event proved that the defeated enemy uses all means and that he tries to take advantage of every opportunity to avoid Yugoslavian captivity. Respect for the general capitulation of the German army on Slovenian soil therefore had to be enforced with weapons. The headquarters of the 4th operational zone demanded that the British troops, in accordance with the provisions of the international law of war, immediately hand over the escaped von Lohr as a prisoner of war. The British military authorities did this on May 15, when the fighting at Poljana was already over. The Yugoslavian units pressed the ring around the enemy units even more decisively, and on May 13 the enemy began fierce attempts to break out of their embrace. He first began to attack near Dravograd, and at the same time his strong group, which attacked in the direction of Kotlje-Guštanj (now Ravne)-Tolsti vrh, cut through the defense of the 51st Division on the Tolsti vrh-Stražiški vrh ridge and hit the back of the main body of their 8th. and the 12th Vojvodina Brigade. For the sake of this success, some units of this division had to retreat to the left bank of the Drava, and some smaller groups of the enemy slipped through the Dravograj railway bridge to the other side during the night fight, and then rushed towards Labot. But the enemy could not use this as a bridgehead for the passage of his troops to Austrian Carinthia near Dravograd,248 Meanwhile, the Yugoslav forces strengthened the prisons even more. The units of the 12th division came to the northern section, and the 16th division, which was in the area of Celje, was ordered that day to move on trucks across Ljubljana, Kranj, Jezerska and Železna Kapla to strengthen the blockade at Pliberk. She set out on May 14, the next day she was in Kranj, but she arrived too late to her defensive section because the fighting had already ended. At the same time, the headquarters of the 14th Division ordered on May 13 that part of Šlandrov’s and Zidanšek’s brigades, which had arrived in Carinthia via Maribor, and Bračič’s brigade east of Borovelj and Apač in Carinthia, where they were disarming the 14th SS Division “Galizien”, to occupy bridges over the Drava River from Galicia to Lipica and close these passages airtight. Thus, a second blocking line was created, in case enemy troops broke through the first, narrower ring. Even on May 14, the enemy’s plans did not materialize. The Seventeenth Division broke the resistance of the defenders at Dolič, liberated Slovenj Gradec and pushed the enemy to the north. On the same day, near Dravograd, from positions above the left bank of the Drava, parts of the 51st Division, the 2nd Battalion of the Prekmurska Brigade and two Bulgarian regiments attacked the enemy, and the artillery also pounded the crossroads near Podklanec, where the enemy units were gathering in order to get to the Meže valley. When the units attacking near Dravograd came into contact with the 17th division attacking from Slovenj Gradac near the village of Bukova, around 20,000 enemy soldiers surrendered in this section of the battlefield. Two battalions of the 1st shock brigade “Toneta Tomšič”, the battalion of the 6th shock brigade “Slavka Šlandra” and the battalion of the 7th Vojvodina brigade of the 51st division were in positions around the intersection near Poljana in the Mežiška valley. In a violent attack on that day, the Ustasha units first broke through the too shallow defense of the Vojvodina people and opened a path along the railway line along Dolge brdo towards Holmec, and then the defense of the Tomšičevski on the slopes of Lom, in order to allow them to retreat along the Poljana-Košutnik-Libuče road. In the face of intense enemy pressure, the overextended units of the 51st Division had to retreat to the heights towards Jamnica and Strojna, and Tomšičeva towards the western part of Lom. Through this opening, enemy columns rushed to the Austrian side.
248 Mitja Hribovšek Prekmurska brigade, p. 200-205; data of France Strlet; Tone Ferenc, Final operations for the liberation of Slovenia, lecture at the XV. meeting of Slovenian historians in Velenje, 1970.
1000, 1001
“1002 Struggles for Final Liberation”
But already during the battle at Poljana and on the night of May 15, the headquarters of the 14th Division quickly formed the Pliberk-Libuče defensive line. On the heights north of the railway line, at Borovje, there were units of Zidanško’s brigade and the 7th brigade of the 51st division, and at Libič near Pliberk, part of Zidanško’s brigade. South of the railway line, from Hrust to the south, with a focus on Spodnje and Zgornje Libuče, were the troops of the 3rd battalion of Tomšič’s brigade, and a huge crowd of enemy soldiers, mixed with refugees, spread across the plains between the state border, Hrust and Libuče. In the afternoon of May 15, new units of the 51st Division arrived via Dob and Pliberk, and the units of the 3rd Army, which broke the enemy’s resistance at Dravograd, meanwhile continued to push through the Meže valley in order to squeeze the enemy into an even narrower space and force him to submit. Talks about the surrender began already on May 14, and ended, with the participation of representatives of the 14th and 51st division headquarters, the headquarters of the British corps and a member of the British military mission at the headquarters of the 4th operational zone, around noon on May 15 in Plibersk Castle. , because the enemy, who was convinced that his resistance was futile due to the solid ring of Yugoslav troops, and the British troops did not take the Yugoslav quislings under protection, had only the option of surrender. In the evening of that day, this, the last large group of the enemy, in which there were around 30,000 soldiers, surrendered. The majority were Ustashi and Chetniks, including twelve Ustashi generals and the entire Montenegrin Chetnik leadership. 249 During the described events, Lack’s partisan detachment operated independently in Kobansko and Kozjak. On May 8, near Marenberg (now Radlje ob Drava), he attacked a column of retreating units of the German 2nd Armored Army, and when the capitulation of the entire German army was announced, he went down to the Austrian side, in the Čakava valley, and began to liberate the areas there. In Ivnik (Eibiswald) the next day, he established a commando of the city. He also occupied Travnik (Wies), Osek (Haag), Arvež
249 Tone Ferenc The last days of the war in Slovenia Our defense, no. 6, June 1970 p. 15· Liberation war of the nation of Yugoslavia 1941-1945 vol. 2 p. 634; Final operations for the liberation of Yugoslavia 1944-1945 p. 711-715; Mitja Hribovšek, Prekmurska brigade, p. 204-210; Miroslav Stiplovšek, Šlandrov’s brigade, p. 693-702; Mirko Fajdiga, Zidanškova brigade, p. 698-701.
1002
(Arnfels), Lučane (Leutschah) and Glinica (Gleinstattten) and also went to Lipnica (Leibnitz), where he got in touch with the command of the Soviet division. Until May 14, he maintained order in the area from Ivnik to Št.Ili in Slovenske gorice, and the next day he went to Maribor as part of its garrison. Meanwhile, in Carinthia, the units of the 4th operational zone disarmed the enemy and at the same time maintained order with the British troops. An honor guard of Slovene national liberation fighters stood next to the sovereign princely stone, a famous monument of the Slovenian past in the middle of the beautiful Carinthian land. City commands and partisan guards operated in all major towns from Velikovac to Ziljska dolina. British military commands soon began to obstruct the work of the Yugoslav liberation forces in various ways. The antagonisms, which originated from the duality of military power in Austrian Carinthia, escalated more and more. The request of the provisional Yugoslav government of May 7, that the governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, in terms of the right of the Slovenian nation to self-determination, recognize the annexation of all those places in Carinthia inhabited by Slovenes to Yugoslavia, was not accepted. On May 21, 1945, all units of the 4th operational zone had to withdraw across the Yugoslav-Austrian border to Yugoslav territory. At the same time, the Yugoslav government declared that it reserves the right to demand the annexation of the Slovenian national territory in Carinthia to the mother country of Slovenia and Yugoslavia at the future peace conference.251
***
If we concluded about the final operations in the western part of Slovenia that they meant far-reaching and decisive military successes in the fight for the annexation of the Slovenian littoral and Istria and the complete military collapse of the armed units formed by the united Slovenian anti-people forces, we must conclude for the area of northeastern Slovenia , that the Yugoslav and Slovenian liberation forces, in the final operations on the territory of the 4th operational zone, defeated the last of the three occupiers who dismembered Slovenian land in the April War of 1941. This very part of Slovenia, which the Nazi enslavers considered their strongest outpost, became the scene of their worst defeat. The previously mighty structure of violence, denationalization and alienation of Slovenes, as well as the enslavement of other Yugoslav nations and nationalities, collapsed. The final operations in north-eastern Slovenia were also the result of the joint fighting efforts of all Yugoslav nations and nationalities. The units of the Slovenian 4th operational zone, which operated in the enemy’s rear, in front of the battle line of the three Yugoslav armies, played an extremely important role in these battles. It could be said that the flexible, initiative, combative and self-sacrificing front detachments were the main body of the Yugoslav liberation army. With their combat activity, with ambushes and barricades in the direction of the enemy’s retreat, with imaginative and courageous action at key tactical points, making good use of the land, with strikes on transport connections and with rapid movements from one area to another center of gravity, they enabled the success of operations of large of Yugoslav units, which, according to the guidelines of the JA General Staff, penetrated frontally.
250 Milan Ževart, Lack’s detachment, manuscript. 251 See also: Tone Ferenc Milica Kacin-Wohinz, Tone Zorn, Slovenes in Foreign Countries, Review of History 1918-1945, p. 310-312.
the units of the 4th operational zone, still operating in a partisan manner, had the advantage of the Yugoslav liberation forces as a whole and enabled them to capture the bulk of the German Balkan grouping as well as the bulk of the Quisling troops. In their activity, the units of the 4th operational zone skilfully exploited weaknesses and contradictions in the enemy camp, as well as the possibilities of a rapidly developing and dynamic situation. They rushed boldly and decisively into the enemy’s deployment, appearing suddenly and surprising him. They prevented him from carrying out his plans to organize a retreat. In any case, in the final operations, they were the strategic factor on the battlefield that decisively helped realize the goal of the Yugoslav liberation forces, to capture the bulk of the occupying and Quisling troops in Yugoslav territory. Indeed, if it were not for their activity inside the enemy’s rear, his columns could have made an organized retreat from the territory of Yugoslavia without any particular problems. Faced with the tenacity of the Ustasha and Chetnik units, which at the same time as the Germans wanted to break into Carinthia in order to avoid Yugoslavian captivity and surrender to the British troops, combat operations on Slovenian soil were only completed on May 15, a week after the signing of the capitulation of the armed forces of the German Reich. Since by then all major groups of the Nazi army had surrendered to the troops of the anti-Hitler coalition, we can rightly conclude that the Second World War in Europe ended in Slovenia.
THE FIRST NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF SLOVENIA
The already known Tito-Šubašić agreement meant that the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia faithfully adheres to the provisions of the Atlantic Declaration and the conclusions of the Tehran Conference. The obstacles on the way from the composition of Šubasic’s government in London only from the ranks of representatives of former bourgeois Yugoslav politicians to the composition of a unified Yugoslav government were due to the brilliant successes of the national liberation struggle of the Yugoslav nations and their unity, as well as for the sake of ~support of the Yugoslavs abroad, but successfully overcome. On November 2, Tito and Šubasic agreed on the formation of a unified Yugoslav government. The conference of the great powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, which was held in Yalta from February 4 to 11, 1945, also adopted the position that the November agreement should be implemented immediately. Thus, at the beginning of March 1945, Tito was able to form the first provisional Yugoslav government in Belgrade from the representatives of the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia and Šubasic’s government abroad, which soon received international recognition. 252 The question of the form of government, whether Yugoslavia would be a republic or a monarchy, was postponed until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, which would be elected in the first general elections after the liberation of the country. King Peter II, tarnished by Chetnik treachery. Karadordevic had to resign and agree to the royal viceroyalty, consisting of three prominent politicians in whom the liberation movement also had confidence. Thus, the elections for the constituent assembly in November 1945 were at the same time a kind of referendum, in which the masses of people overwhelmingly voted for the republic. As we have seen, the expectation that Slovenia would see its liberation already in the late autumn of 1944 was not fulfilled. The development of the events of the war took place in a different way, and even greater efforts and sacrifices were required. Slovenia was already prepared for this at that time, as it had all the basic state bodies and a network of field national liberation committees or OF committees throughout the national territory. Also in
252 War of Liberation of the Nation of Yugoslavia, vol. 2, p. 535-536.
1004, 1005
during the severe winter months of 1944/45, this fundamental network of government bodies was preserved despite the violent pressure of the occupier. The administrative sections at the SNOS presidency and in other autonomous bodies, in the NOO and in the OF committees, only increased their activity and, as far as conditions and possibilities allowed, coordinated it with the work of the central Yugoslav state bodies. Of course, the work of the economic sections was still the most important at the moment. In the liberated territory, the NOV and PO of Slovenia in this, the last period of the war, were already feeding themselves from warehouses that were taken care of by economic institutions. However, where there were no warehouses, the old field method of supply continued to work, so that the army found its own food through purchases or purchases, or had to carry out military operations in unliberated territories. There were still very useful salt exchanges for food along the Slovene-Croatian border, and channels for the supply of food and necessities from Friuli, Ljubljana, Zagreb and Styria were still operating. There were several cooperative shops in the liberated territory. Allied shipments also partially contributed to the nutrition of the civilian population and the army. 253 The finance department of the SNOS presidency reported that in 1944 it had more than 46 million liras of income and almost 45 million liras of expenses. The main income was still the tax and excise duty, as well as the already considerable grant from the presidency of the SNOS, which received money from the Avnoy and allied loan. Other sections were also developing well, and their work was already more and more oriented towards the time after the war. The two larger self-governing units, the district NOO Novo mesto and Ribnica-Notranjska, lived almost completely independently, although they were increasingly occupied. In the Novo Mesto district, military units and various civilian bases were supplied in three ways: in the liberated territory, the local NOO took care of food, in the semi-liberated areas, the activists of the OF committees, and in the occupied areas, the army carried out food campaigns and paid for food with receipts. But the food problems were getting worse and worse, so they began to set special ones
253 Metod Mikuž, Overview of the history of the national liberation struggle in Slovenia, vol. 5, p. 5-23.
district food commissions, which collected food supplies for each month. These problems were also the result of the fact that economically richer areas were increasingly occupied, while passive areas were increasingly depleted. Food was somewhat better in Primorska, as long as delivery from Friuli was possible, and there were no serious problems with food in Gorenjska and Štajerska either. 254 The Executive Committee of the Liberation Front discussed preparations and measures for the final liberation at a meeting on April 7, 1945. He also concluded “to form the Slovenian government internally now, and to announce it at the time when part of Slovenia is liberated, or at the most politically convenient opportunity”. The government will be appointed by the presidency, but if the situation permits, a meeting of the SNOS will be called. The IOOF also set the criteria for the composition of the government. This should be the working government of the OF, and its composition must have the full breadth of the liberation movement. The practical leader of all politics must continue to be the IOOF. The government will have a president, a vice president and eleven portfolios. IOOF also fully agreed with the submitted list of candidates. 255 Since the 4th Army of the JA had already received the order to attack directly towards Trieste, it was uncertain whether the Bela krajina would remain free in the face of ever-increasing enemy pressure. That is why the SNOS presidency started preparing for its evacuation and on April 27 ordered all the institutions of the liberation movement to withdraw from Bela krajina to Gorski kotar. On April 23, Edvard Kardelj, a member of the political bureau of the KPJ central committee, telegraphed the central committee of the KPS that it would be appropriate from a political point of view to form a Slovenian government as soon as Slovenia is firmly secured. Since, in his opinion, Bela krajina was already out of danger, they should convene an extended meeting of the SNOS presidency and form a government. On the morning of April 27, Boris Kidrič replied to him that the government would be formed on the same day, but Kardelj informed him that it should be postponed for a week, because it is necessary to wait for the success of the military operations, which will give the government even more importance. He agreed that the government should be formed in Črnomlje. Already on April 27, all institutions had to withdraw from Bela krajina. On April 29, Kardel’s dispatch arrived at the central committee of the KPS in Gorski Kotar, which at the end read: “Trieste is your main party task today!”. 256 Two days later, Kardelj announced that they should prepare a meeting of the SNOS presidency for the appointment of the government, which should be held on May 3 or 4, and announced agreement with the list of candidates. They decided that they would declare the government in Ajdovščina, a beautiful square in the middle of the Vipava Valley. Thus, on May 5, 1945, in Ajdovščina, a ceremonial meeting of the presidency of the Slovenian National Liberation Council took place, at which the first Slovenian national government was appointed. It was composed as follows: president Boris Kidrič, vice-president dr. Marijan Brecelj, Minister of Internal Affairs Zoran Polič, Minister of Justice dr. Jože Pokorn, Minister of Education Dr. Ferdo Kozak, Minister of Finance dr. Aleš Bebler, Minister of Industry and Mining Franc Leskošek, Minister of Trade and Supply dr. Lado Vavpetič, Minister of Agriculture Janez Hribar, Minister of Forestry Tone Fajfar, Minister of Social Policy Vida Tomšič, Minister of National Health dr. Marijan Ahčin, Minister of Construction dr. Miha Kambič and the Minister for Local Transport Franc Snoj.257 The personal composition of the government testifies that it was in fact the government of the Liberation Front, as it included representatives of all those groups that merged into a single stream of the liberation movement of the Slovenian nation during the national liberation struggle. On May 10, 1945, the government introduced itself to newly liberated Ljubljana amid indescribable enthusiasm. The importance and tasks of the Slovenian national government are clearly visible from the ceremony
254 ibid., p. 5-23. 255 ibid., p. 8. 256 ibid., p. 10-11. 257 ibid., p. 11-12.
1006, 1007
the vow prescribed by the law on the national government of Slovenia and which each of its members took individually: to serve his nation faithfully and tirelessly, to fulfill all his duties conscientiously and devotedly, to above all guard and defend freedom and independence, brotherhood and unity of all the nations of Yugoslavia, as well as all the gains of the national liberation struggle and did everything for the progress of federal Slovenia and Democratic Federative Yugoslavia.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINAL PART OF THE LIBERATION WAR OF THE SLOVAK NATION
The struggle of the Slovenian national liberation units in the period from December 1944, when the efforts of the occupier and his helpers to clear the rear of the battlefield between the Italian and Soviet-German fronts, until the victorious end of the liberation war in mid-May 1945, began to rage, was undoubtedly the most difficult of all the long four-year war period. During the enemy’s winter offensive, NOV lost most of the liberated territories. In Styria and Primorska, it was pushed high into the snowy mountains, and in Dolenjska it barely defended the central part of the free territory – the White Landscape. Its units were severely weakened in numbers. They had to once again use tried and tested partisan tactics to preserve manpower and weapons. The blows, which were sometimes severe and painful, could not break the fighting ability of the Slovenian National Liberation Army, because its core, hardened in countless skirmishes and campaigns, with the simultaneous mobilization of newcomers, it once again went on a determined attack in many sections of the Slovenian battlefield. On the slopes of Kočevski Rog and in Suha Krajina, the course of the battle even had the character of a real front, similar to the fronts on the great battlefields of the Second World War. The units of the 4th operational zone prevented the enemy from building fortified defense lines in the interior of Slovenian Styria, all of them however, we can conclude that they kept their starting positions for the last clashes with the enemy. The part of the unified armed forces of Yugoslavia, which was under the command of the main headquarters of the JA for Slovenia in the enemy’s rear, fulfilled important tasks. In the worst weeks and months before the end of the war, when the higher staffs were already thinking about the fact that it might be necessary to withdraw the units from such a threatened territory, the Slovenian units not only held out in all areas of the Slovenian homeland, but also defended themselves from the enemy’s the superiority of the White Landscape and ensured the work of the central political and governmental bodies. This, in turn, enabled the Liberation Front to establish people’s power throughout Slovenian territory while liberating the country, and to prepare the organizational and personnel design of the first post-war administration. Due to the successful adaptation to the difficult conditions that existed before the end of the war, the organs of the liberation movement and the people’s government, the network of courier unions and intelligence points remained on the ground throughout Slovenia. During the final battles, they gave valuable help to the liberation army and were an important factor. The more the enemy’s power weakened, the more existing and new OF organizations were strengthened on the ground, and the willingness of people to help in the fight grew. The local authorities were the organizers of the general public activity, and the units were strengthened practically on the fly with new recruits, who were immediately given combat assignments. With the advance of the liberation troops, local organizations and authorities, in the spirit of the guidelines of higher authorities, district and district committees of the OF and KPS committees, started actions independently. They disarmed groups of occupying and Quisling soldiers, assembled new partisan guards and National Defense units. If no NOV unit came to their place, they themselves announced his liberation and arranged everything necessary to secure property, public facilities and important points. We can rightly conclude that even at the end of the war, the immense strength of the Liberation Front, the unity of the masses with its army and political leadership, and the deep commitment to the revolutionary program of the Communist Party and the Liberation Front were shown at every step. During joint operations, we can determine With the collapse of the occupier, the alienation of Slovenian reactionary circles from humanity was completely exposed. When his power and authority were gone, they wretchedly, in mortal fear of the wrath of their own nation, sought their way into the bosom of a new master, whom they expected would bring them back to power.
The previously dark and quiet Ljubljana seethed in the ecstasy of liberation when the enemy columns left to flee across Karavanke. Other Slovenian cities and squares also welcomed their fighters with indescribable enthusiasm upon liberation. But at the same time, it was a proud triumph of a self-confident, heroic nation that fought for its freedom. He was not possessed by hatred of the vanquished, but simply worried about how he would restore his country in freedom and start his creative work in peace. With the military assessment of the final operations for the liberation of Slovenia, we must state that the combined maneuver and cooperation of the Slovenian units, which were in the enemy’s rear, with the four armies of the JA, which penetrated frontally and which are around the main enemy group, retreating from Yugoslavia, formed the two arms of a wide pincer, a decisive and strategically important advantage of the Yugoslav liberation forces. Even a much better equipped army would not be able to perform its tasks so well if it only pushed the retreating enemy in front of them.
1008, 1009
In this case, the tactical and operational activity of the Slovenian units in the enemy’s rear was the factor that enabled the main body to achieve such brilliant successes, as it facilitated its maneuver and gave it the opportunity to direct itself towards key objectives. In the final operations, the units under the command of the main staff of the JA for Slovenia were not just some kind of partisan formation that would only sow unrest in the enemy’s rear, but were a great force that actually played the role of another JA army, even more successful in this regard because operated in this hinterland. They independently and successfully intervened in the battles at the most important points and enabled the Yugoslav Army as a whole to achieve well-known successes in closing operations. On May 18, the main headquarters of the JA for Slovenia was disbanded. Let us also underline that, when the Yugoslav front moved to Slovenian territory, the 7th Corps took over its front section in Dolenjska and Notranjska, and thus also part of the strategic ring that the armies of the anti-Hitler coalition formed around Nazi Germany. The Yugoslav army was the fourth army of this coalition in terms of the number of soldiers. The operations of the 7th Corps are an example of how a large unit fighting in the enemy’s rear can, with the development of operations, become an integral part of the frontally penetrating forces and take over part of their battle line. The far-reaching consequences of JA’s truly excellent joint operations could be summarized in a few findings. By the fact that the Yugoslav armed forces, including the units of the 9th Corps, liberated Trieste and the territory up to the Soča River, or the Slovenian national borders, even before the arrival of the Western Allies, and by the fact that they forced the German 97th Army Corps to surrender even before the general capitulation of the Nazi armies was signed, they implemented the decree of AVNOJ and other leading bodies of the national liberation movement on the annexation of the Slovenian littoral and Istria to the motherland. At the same time, they prevented the plans of reactionary forces at home and abroad to influence the course of events with the help of overrun Home Guard and Chetnik units and tried to rob the people of the gains of their liberation struggle and revolution. Unfortunately, we cannot determine such consequences based on the territory on which the Slovenians live in Carinthia. The national liberation units that were formed in this part of the Slovenian national territory were joined in the final operations by the units of the 4th operational zone and the 9th corps and the Motorized Detachment of the 4th Army, but they could not ensure that the natural desire of the Carinthian Slovenes to live in the future in united Slovenia. This was particularly helped by the complication of international relations in the direction of bloc division. Another consequence of the fraternal cooperation of the armed forces of all Yugoslav nations and nationalities in the final operations on Slovenian soil was the breaking up and destruction of a large part of the armed divisions that the reactionary political circles in Yugoslavia managed to form during the war of liberation. As these various armed formations, no matter how different they were in their political views, were united during the war by hatred of the progressive liberation movement, servitude to a foreigner and reliance on his power, which pushed them into the shameful role of the occupier’s helpers and guardians of the chains in which wanted to handcuff the freedom-loving Yugoslav nations, so at the end of the war they were united by the fear of their own nation and the hope that they would be saved with foreign help. returned. Everyone, Serbian, Montenegrin or Liš Chetniks, Ustashi, Slovene home guards or police officers from any province fled together at the same time as ex-Kulturbund members and similar Nazi helpers. The successful capture of the vast majority of these formations and groups meant not only their collapse and the collapse of the collaborationist policy, but also the removal of the great danger that after the war, under certain circumstances, international relations, which were increasingly moving in the direction of intensifying bloc antagonisms between the East and To the West, they became a means of pressure on the new Yugoslavia or perhaps the whole core of counter-revolutionary intervention. The reactionary forces in Yugoslavia suffered such a terrible blow in the closing operations that they never recovered from it. At the same time, however, it must be emphasized that the tension was because the armed forces of the Yugoslav nations had to deal so fiercely with traitorous anti-people armed units in the final operations, the presence of the liberation units in Carinthia was weaker, and the movement of large JA units into this part of the Slovenian national territory slower or couldn’t get there at all. This was certainly not in favor of the fight for a fairer regulation of the national rights of Slovenes in Carinthia. The third far-reaching consequence of the victorious final operations on Slovenian soil was the complete collapse of the German occupier and his imperialist violence against the Slovenians. The main part of the German occupation army, retreating from Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania, was forced to lay down its arms in the land it had once occupied and to capitulate to the army that was formed in it during this occupation. In the final operations, the Yugoslav armed forces captured and took into captivity together with the Quislings around 300,000 enemy soldiers and officers, of which 175,000 were members of the German army. Only around 30,000 of them managed to escape to Austria in time. Just before the end of the war, the Slovenian part of the Yugoslav armed forces numbered seven divisions (one was Italian), 28 brigade-sized units (one engineering, three Italian) and twelve detachments (two naval). According to the inspection of the main staff of the JA for Slovenia dated April 26, 1945, without the units of the National Defense Division, which also included a team of permanent courier unions, the liberation units of Slovenia numbered 37,901 fighters and elders, and without rear military bodies (11,234) a total of 26,667 fighters and of elders. 258 It is not possible to determine how many fighters the units were reinforced during the operations for the final liberation of the homeland, which in many areas had the character of a popular uprising.
258 Proceedings XI/4, doc. no. 63. 1010, 1011
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