66 TOČAKA PRIZIVNIG SUDA U NEW YORKU KAKO JE FBI GLEDALA NA RAD HNO I NA “NEW-YORŠKI PROCES”…
ORGANIZACIJA HRVATSKI NARODNI OTPOR, HNO POTPUNO OSLOBOĐEN SVIH KRIVNJIPRIZIVNI SUD ZA OPTUŽENE: Ante Ljubas, Mile Markić, Milan Bagarić, Ranko Primorac, Vinko Logarušić i Drago Sudar.OSLOBOĐENI: MILE BOBAN, MIRO BIOŠIĆ, IVAN MIŠETIĆ I ANĐELJKO JAKIĆ.Dragi rodijače poslije telefonskog razgovora sa tobom, sjetio sam se da sam nešto imao o toj temi. Pregledao sam moj e-mail arhivu i pronađoh što ti šaljem. Kako ćeš po datumu vidjeti kada je to bilo, imao skoro pet godina, šaljem ti ovo u nadi da ćeš naći vremena za ovo pročitati. |
Annie Boban<froate@hotmail.com>, August 19, 2011 1O:09 PM |
Fri, Aug 19, 2011 at 3:08 PM |
| To: trup1959@gmail.com, froate@hotmail.com | |
|
Donosim ovdje 66 Točaka prizivng suda u New York-u kako je FBI gledala na rad HNO i na njujorški proces.
Ovo sam slučajno pronašao da sada ni sam ne znam gdje i na kojem internetu. Jako interesantno. Ima dosta istine i FBI-ovskog uljepšavanja. Svakako da će doći vrijeme kada će se netko ozbiljno pozabaviti ovim slučajem njeujorških procesa kroz koje su prošli mnogi hrvatski vatereni, rodoljubi, pimenice Zvonko Bušić i njegova skupina, Miro Barešić i Ivan Vuičević, Ivan Čale sa svojom skupinom iz Orgnizacije Hrvatski Narodni Otpor, HNO, Pročelnik Hrvatskog Narodnog Otpora, HNO Mile Boban, Ante ljubas, Mile Markić, Milan Bagarić, Ivan Mišetić, Vinko Logarušić, Anđelko Jakoć, Ranko Primorac, Miro Biošić, Drago Sudar i drugi. Ako se nekada netko bude potrudio nešto napisati o ovim njujorškim procesima, Otporaš ima mnogo dokumentacije o tim procesima. Ako se ostane na status quo, tj. da se ništa ne poduzme i ne iznese istina, onda će se za sigurno vjerovati Udbi, Josipu Vrbiću i njegovoj Kroniki, i svim onima koji su se urotovali protiv HNO, tako da će biljeg svih negativnosti i jugoslavenskih podvala ostati na ramenima Hrvatskog Narodnog Otpora.
Kada su američke federate vlasti, FBI 25 lipnja 1981. godine sinhorizirano uhapsli deset Hrvata članova HNO, optužnica je glasila na ime organizacije HNO kao krivca za sva krivična djela. Ja sam već bio u pritvoru, zatvoru. Moj pok. brat Rafo Boban (1944-2004) je preko svojih veza koji su mu preporučili odvjetnika Dennis Roberts-a iz Oakland-a pokraj San Francisca. On me je došao posjetiti u zatvor, a već je imao uvid u težinu optužnice. Upitao me je, između ostaloga “dali je vaša organizacija HNO službeno registrirana kao NON PROFIT ORGANIZATION”. Rekao sam da jest, našto je Dennis rekao da je sada sve lakiše, jer, u protivnom slučaju optužnica tereti organizaciju OTOPR kao pokretač svih krivičnih djela. Ako je organizacija registrirana i ima dozvolu djelovati na području Amerike, onda će organizacija OTPOR biti oslobođena, a krivi će biti samo pojedinci koji su počinili krivična djela, ako su ih počinili i ako ih porota pronađe krivima.
Ja sam gosp. Dennis-u Roberts dao original službene registrirane dozvole koju smo mi u ime organizacije HNO podnijeli molbu 28 ožujka 1977. godine, a koja je više od šest mjesci od strane službenih vlasti i FBI temeljito provjerena i konačno nama izdana u glavnom gradu Californije Sacramento 17 listopda 1977. godine kao: CROATIAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE – NON PROFIT ORGTANIZATION. Kako ja tada nisam bio građanin Amerike, ja nisam mogao potpisati molbu u ime organizacije CROATIAN CATIONAL RESISTANCE – HRVATSKI NARODNI. Potpisali su oni koji su već bili američki naturalizirani građani: Moja sestra Kata Grizelj, moj zet Ante Grizelj, moj (sada pokojni) brat Rafo Boban, Nedjeljko Miličević i Ivan Kapetanović. Tako smo dobili od američkih vlasti službenu dozvolu da organizacija Hrvatski Narodni Otpor kao organizacija NON PROFIT ORGANIZATION može djelovati u SAD. I ovom službenom dozvolom (kopije i original su kod mene) djelovanja organizacije Hrvatskog Narodnog Otpora, HNO spasio se je ugled jedne velike i državotvorne hrvatske organizacije, bez koje prvi predsjednik RH dr. Franjo Tuđman bi imao velikih poteškoća ostvariti ono što je ostvario, a ostvario je državu RH uz pomoć državotvornih Hrvata i pomirdbene ideje Maksa Luburića. Otporaš.
706 F.2d 42 13 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 421 UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, Nos. 887, 875, 932, 877, 876 and 886, Dockets 82-1247, United States Court of Appeals, Argued March 9, 1983. Stuart J. Baskin, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., S.D.N.Y., New York City (John S. Martin, Jr., U.S. Atty., Paul L. Shechtman, Roanne L. Mann, Asst. U.S. Attys., New York City, of counsel), for the United States of America. Michael D. Monico, Chicago, Ill. (Barry A. Spevack, Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for Milan Bagaric. Jeffrey A. Rabin, Brooklyn, N.Y., for Mile Markich. Michael Young, New York City, for Ante Ljubas. Newman & Adler, New York City (Roger Bennet Adler, New York City, of counsel), for Vinko Logarusic and Drago Sudar. Jacob R. Evseroff, Brooklyn, N.Y., for Ranko Primorac. Before KAUFMAN, TIMBERS and KEARSE, Circuit Judges. IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge: 1Milan Bagaric, Mile Markich, Ante Ljubas, Vinko Logarušić, Ranko Primorac, and Drago Sudar appeal from judgments of conviction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, after a trial before Chief Judge Motley and a jury. Appellants urge reversal, relying not only on a series of claimed infirmities of the usual sort, but also upon this court’s recent refusal to permit prosecution of a terrorist organization pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, where the Government failed to allege the group or its activities possessed any financial dimension or purpose. See United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.1983). We are asked to expand that holding to the facts of this case. We decline to do so, since the overwhelming proof at trial showed that the defendants, acting through their criminal enterprise, perpetrated an extensive international extortion scheme using the United States and foreign mails. In addition, the defendants directed numerous acts of violence against certain supporters of Yugoslavia. Because we also reject appellants’ myriad other contentions, we affirm the convictions.
2* The massive, complex and convoluted record of this thirteen-week trial established that appellants were members of a Croatian terrorist group operating principally in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, with participants in Cleveland, San Francisco, Toronto, South America, and Europe. Acting through their criminal enterprise, they perpetrated an international extortion scheme against “moderate Croatians” and persons they believed to be supporters of the government of Yugoslavia, resorting to multiple acts of violence against those not sufficiently sympathetic to their cause. We chronicle the history of their activities in some detail.
3Operating from his home base in Chicago, Ante Ljubas began in late 1974 to recruit and hire persons to commit murders and bombings. In each case, the intended victim was to be an individual considered unsympathetic to the cause of Croatian independence from Yugoslavia. In time, Ljubas approached a long-time acquaintance, Frank Korenić, inquiring whether Korenic could obtain explosives, and requesting that Korenic introduce Ljubas to one Joe Neary. Neary, a notorious Chicago gangster, was a frequent customer at a restaurant where Korenić’s ex-wife was a waitress, and the two men had known one another since 1973. Korenić took Ljubas to Neary’s home, where Ljubas was introduced to Neary and another local gangster, Louis Almeida. Ljubas told these two men he “was working with other people,” and would be willing to pay well for a series of contract killings. He offered $20,000 for the first murder, and $10,000 for each of approximately ten additional assassinations. Neary and Almeida agreed to perform the killings. Accordingly, Ljubas gave them a photograph and the address of the first intended victim, John Badovinac. At that time, Badovinac was president of the Croatian Fraternal Union in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, an organization Ljubas regarded as pro-Yugoslavian.
4In February, 1975, Neary and Almeida travelled to Pittsburgh, and went to Badovinac’s office. Uncertain whether that was the best locale at which to carry out the murder, they drove to Badovinac’s home address and “look[ed] the place over[,] trying to figure out how … to assassinate him there.” Still undecided, they telephoned Badovinac’s office, only to discover, from his secretary, that Badovinac was out of town attending a meeting. Neary and Almeida returned to Chicago to tell Ljubas of their frustration. The three men met at a restaurant near Ljubas’s home, where Ljubas expressed his unhappiness that Neary and Almeida had not “[gotten] the job done.”
5In March, Neary and Almeida set off to Pittsburgh a second time. En route, they were stopped by Ohio police for speeding. A search of their car turned up a .38 Colt firearm with a four-inch barrel, a .380 automatic Barretta, a .380 Walther PPKS with silencer, and a photograph of Badovinac. Shortly after his arrest on firearms charges, Almeida told Illinois state police that Ante Ljubas had approached Neary and Almeida and hired them to murder a man in Pittsburgh.
6Undeterred by the intervention of fate which spared Badovinac, Ljubas sought out co-appellant Milan Bagarić, and had Bagarić introduce him to Ante Ćaran.1 Bagarić and Ljubas demonstrated to Ćaran the nature and seriousness of their endeavor. Bagarić showed him explosives the two men were storing in Bagaric’s basement, and Ljubas instructed Ćaran on techniques of bomb construction. Shortly thereafter, apparently convinced of Caran’s bona fides, Ljubas asked Ćaran if he would be willing to recruit two men to bomb the Pittsburgh home of Milan Vranes, an officer of the Croatian Fraternal Union. Ljubas provided Ćaran with the address of Vranes’s home in Pittsburgh and told Ćaran to pick up the bomb at Bagaric’s apartment. Ćaran acquired the services of two friends, Andrija Škrabo and Vjelko Jakšić.2 The three men went to Bagarić’s home, where they were shown a bomb and timer device built by Bagarić. Škrabo and Jakšić drove to Pittsburgh with the bomb.
7In Pittsburgh, the two men had difficulty locating Vranes’s home. After consulting a local telephone directory, they drove to an address other than that provided by Ljubas. They set the timer on the bomb and left it in a snowbank near the sidewalk of that house, later learning from a radio broadcast that the bomb had exploded. Soon after, Bagaric informed them they had bombed the wrong house.
8This series of misadventures in Pittsburgh seems reminiscent of Inspector Clouseau-style bumbling. Unfortunately, tragedy soon replaced what had appeared to be a comedy of errors. Ljubas and Bagarić, undaunted, continued their private war, taking on new soldiers along the way. Beginning in early 1977, the members of the criminal enterprise began an operation to stockpile dynamite in the United States and to transport it for use in various cities.3 Ljubas asked Ćaran to arrange for the use of an automobile “to go to Canada to bring some explosive[s].” Ćaran secured the assistance of Mićo Jakšić, brother of Vjelko.4 Ljubas, Ćaran, and Mićo Jakšić drove to Canada in Jakšić’s car. Their destination was a small rural town, Elliott Lake, Ontario, site of the huge Dennison uranium mines, the ex-employer of appellant Mile Markich.
9Upon arrival in Elliott Lake, Ljubas departed alone in the car. He rejoined Ćaran and Mićo Jakšić twenty minutes later, with a bag containing approximately twenty sticks of dynamite which he showed the two men. The dynamite was manufactured by CIL Inc., a Canadian company, bore the coded manufacturing date D7 (signifying April, 1977 manufacture), and had been shipped in April and May of 1977 to Dennison Mines. Ljubas, Ćaran, and Jakšić then drove to the Toronto area, where they stopped at the home of Milan Rukavina, a Croatian acquaintance of Ćaran. To ensure they would not be observed, they drove into Rukavina’s garage, where Jakšić packed the dynamite into the door panels of the car. Blasting caps, also obtained by Ljubas, were separated from the dynamite and were stored “underneath the dashboard so they would blend in with the rest of the wires.” Ljubas left the two men at this point, after instructing them to transport the contraband across the United States-Canada border and deliver it to Markich in Skokie, Illinois. Several days later, Ćaran travelled to Skokie, telephoned Markich to receive directions to the latter’s home, and brought most of the dynamite and blasting caps to Markich, retaining some for his own use.5 After Markich hid the explosives, the two men spoke briefly “[a]bout Croatia and [the] Croatian cause.” Ćaran returned to his home in Milwaukee, and later travelled to San Francisco. There, he went to the home of one Mile Boban, and left the explosives he had not given Markich. Bagarić came to San Francisco and wired the explosives into bombs.6
10Also in mid-1977, appellants formalized and commenced their principal operation, a scheme to extort money from so-called “moderate” Croatians in the United States. Ljubas travelled to West Germany, where he and others committed to the violent overthrow of the Belgrade government determined to adopt a tactic which had previously been employed by Algerian terrorists seeking independence from France. They would send letters to “bad Croatians,” demanding they provide financial support for appellants’ criminal enterprise and also stating that, if they balked, reprisals would be carried out against them.
11Appellant Ranko Primorac headed up the extortion operation in the Los Angeles area, where a number of successful Croatians resided. Primorac compiled a list of potential wealthy victims, and threatened “to squeeze that [sic] people financially, and if they refuse, to be punished [sic] for example for rest of Croatians.” Among other possible targets, Primorac named Steven Bubalo, Krizan Brkic, Marko Zubcic, Frank Striskovitch, and Walter Rasic, all of whom later received extortion letters. The letters demanded that a specified sum of money, generally between $5,000 and $20,000, be mailed to a post office box in Asuncion, Paraguay, or “you will … compel us to set a horrible example by making you the first object of the disciplinary rules.” Miro Barešić, an unindicted co-racketeer, who participated in the enterprise’s affairs during 1977 and 1978, see infra, maintained a box in the same postal office.
12Having established, and set in motion, the extortion scheme, appellants proceeded on two fronts. First, they continued their bombing activities, as well as trafficking in firearms, committing arsons, and attempting additional murders independent of the extortions. At the same time, they began to carry out reprisals against a number of persons who had failed to heed the warnings in the extortion letters.
13In April, 1978, Caran received a telephone call from Los Angeles. The caller instructed Ćaran to retrieve the explosives he had first stored at Boban’s home, and later used in the unsuccessful attempt on the Yugoslavian Consulate, and to deliver them to Primorac and two other men, Miro Biošić and Barešić, in Los Angeles. Škrabo and a man named Ante Šiško delivered the bomb materials on Ćaran’s behalf. After making the delivery, Škrabo joined Barešić, Primorac and several others, and together these men set fire to the Yugoslavian American Club in San Pedro, California.
14Several months later, some of the Canadian dynamite turned up on the East Coast. On August 14, 1978, members of the New York City Bomb Squad disarmed and dismantled two bombs which had been placed in a library at the United Nations and in a locker at Grand Central Station. In a communique left with both bombs, a Croatian terrorist group claimed credit for the attempted bombings, and indicated they were intended to protest West Germany’s decision to extradite to Yugoslavia one Stipe Bilandzic, a Croatian nationalist and close associate of Ljubas, Markich, and Primorac. The nine sticks of dynamite used in the two New York bombs were Cilgel D7 dynamite, a rare brand, yet precisely the one obtained by Ljubas during the Elliott Lake trip, and bearing the same date code. The electrical tape on the United Nations bomb was discovered to exhibit an “end match” with tape utilized in a bombing of the factory of one of the extortion victims, see infra, that is, both bombs were made with contiguous pieces cut from a single roll of black electrical tape.
15In mid-1978, Vjelko Jakšić, then residing in Milwaukee, planned a summer vacation in the San Francisco area. Ćaran asked him to pick up “something,” which turned out to be a handgun equipped with silencer which Ljubas had offered to provide Ćaran. Ljubas had arranged for Bagarić to turn over the gun in Chicago. Vjelko and Mićo Jakšić left Milwaukee for Chicago. Upon arrival, they spoke with Ljubas and Bagarić, and were informed that the weapon had been hidden in Markich’s apartment. The Jakšićs picked up the gun and silencer from Markich. In June, 1978, Vjelko Jakšić went to San Francisco for his holiday, stopping long enough to meet with Ćaran to deliver the gun and silencer. Ćaran later tried to use the gun, unsuccessfully, in an attempt to kill the Yugoslavian consul. (In that time that was Tugomir Džalto, from Livno, mo. Otporaš.)
16Nor did Vjelko Jakšić return to the midwest empty handed. In late May or early June, Primorac had met with Ćaran in California, and asked Ćaran to transport weapons to New York. Primorac provided a Westchester telephone number, which Ćaran was to call upon arrival in the metropolitan area, to be informed of the exact destination for the assorted rifles, machineguns, and ammunition he would be carrying. If Ćaran were unable to travel to the East Coast, he was to deliver the arsenal to the home of Ivan Mišetić in Chicago. As it turned out, Vjelko Jakšić was the courier, rather than Ćaran. He brought the weapons to Chicago, en route to his home in Milwaukee. Eventually, the cache made its way to Irvington, a town in Westchester, and to Bridgeport, Connecticut. After Primorac had attempted to use one of the guns to murder a New York critic of the extortion scheme, Joseph Badurina, agents of the Joint Terrorism Task Force seized the weapons from Ćaran’s home in Bridgeport, and from the Irvington home of Ivan Čale and Stipe Ivkošić, associates and fellow terrorists involved in the principal New York based faction of appellants’ enterprise.7
17The violence threatened in the extortion letters began in the fall of 1978, several months after their mailing. On September 28, Westchester businessman Anthony Cikoja, who had received a letter but refused to pay, was shot and killed on his front lawn. Six weeks after Cikoja’s murder, Chicago factory owner Danilo Nikolić, who had also received an extortion demand, narrowly missed becoming the second victim when a bomb exploded near the section of his plant where flammable liquids were stored. The bomb used in this attempt was prepared in the identical fashion, using the same roll of electrical tape, as the bombs made of Canadian Cilgel dynamite discovered at the United Nations and Grand Central Station.
18In Los Angeles, attacks were carried out on several targets of the extortion scheme. Just after Labor Day, 1978, Primorac had asked Ćaran to leave his work in Sacramento for one week, to kill one Mario Forgiarini, a wealthy recipient of an extortion letter. Three weeks later, Primorac’s roommate, Miro Biošić, met Ćaran at the Los Angeles airport, and after informing Ćaran that Primorac had decided to remain out of town because “he don’t [sic] want to be around if anything is happening,” handed Ćaran a gun and silencer and drove him to Forgiarini’s house. Forgiarini never appeared. Despite Ćaran’s failure to carry out the attempt on the life of Forgiarini, Primorac paid him the $700 week’s wages Ćaran lost.
19In November, 1978, Ćaran moved to Los Angeles. There, he was introduced by Primorac to another Croatian named Marijan Rudela. Acting on Primorac’s instructions, Rudela asked Ćaran to assist him in murdering Forgiarini. This time, Ćaran declined, apparently having decided the proper approach was to “kill some Yugoslavs, some enemy of our people, not the Croatians.” Ćaran did not balk several days later, however, when Rudela suggested an alternative target, Marko Zubcic, another successful businessman who had been the recipient of an extortion letter. Ćaran and Rudela waited near Zubčić’s place of business, intending to ambush him, but Zubčić never emerged.
20The next morning, Rudela suggested yet another victim, Krizan Brkić. Rudela drove to Brkić’s residence and handed Ćaran the same gun and silencer that had previously been provided Ćaran by Primorac’s roommate, Biošić, for the unsuccessful attempt on Forgiarini. Ćaran hid in bushes outside Brkić’s home, and when Brkić appeared in the yard, Ćaran shot and killed him.
21Over the next several months, a new form of violence was employed against the Los Angeles victims. On April 6, 1979, identical pipe bombs, constructed to explode upon impact and scatter metal shrapnel, caused property damage to the homes of Forgiarini and Frank Striškovitch, both of whom, along with Brkić and Zubčić, had been threatened by Primorac. On May 23, 1979, Rudela and another Croatian were killed in the process of arming yet another pipe bomb which detonated prematurely. At the time, Rudela was sitting in an automobile parked seventy feet from the home of extortion victim Martin Balov. According to Bagarić, “We had made a mistake.”
22In 1979, appellants conceived of still an additional reprisal tactic, the mailing of “book bombs,” that is, hardcover books hollowed out, filled with a stick of dynamite and a blasting cap, and wired in such a fashion that the two naked wire ends would join as the book was opened, setting off a powerful explosion designed, in the words of Richard M. Rogers, a special agent examiner in the FBI Explosives Unit, simply “to kill a human being.”
23On February 19, 1979, two of these book bombs were mailed, from Akron, Ohio, to Joseph Badurina, a Queens, New York journalist, and Father Timothy Majić, a Catholic priest in Milwaukee. Both men were Croatian nationalists, of significant influence in their home communities, who had taken explicit and adamant editorial positions against the use of violence. Remarkably, Father Majić was being interviewed by an FBI agent on the morning of February 26, when his mail arrived. The agent, seeing the priest about to open the cover of a black book and observing what appeared to be wires inside, seized the book instantly and threw it into a snowbank in the church courtyard. A police officer from the Milwaukee bomb squad separated the blasting cap from the dynamite, losing part of his hand in the process.
24One week later, Badurina received a similar package. Aware of the unsuccessful attempt to kill Majić, Badurina alerted the FBI. The New York City bomb squad removed the package and disarmed the book.
25On April 4, detectives of the Cleveland Police Department obtained a warrant and searched the residence of appellant Vinko Logarušić. The search turned up a metal toolbox containing more than eight hundred rounds of ammunition and batteries, as well as a hollowed out book containing wires, a battery and a light bulb. This book, described by an FBI expert as the “prototype, or perhaps test book, which was manufactured prior to the other two book bombs,” was the same size as the ones mailed to Badurina and Father Majić, with a depth of exactly one and one-half inches, permitting a stick of dynamite to be placed flat inside. The glue in all three books was of the same chemical composition, the wire was the same gauge, the wires in all three were twisted into loops and L-shaped hooks, and, finally, all three books employed solder, rather than standard battery connectors, to hook the wire to the power source. Laboratory tests showed the same pair of pliers had been used to cut a wire in the bomb sent to Badurina and the one found in Logarušić’s home.
26In August, 1979, Ćaran moved his family to Bridgeport, Connecticut. That autumn, he was approached by Ljubas in the Croatian Center in Manhattan. Ljubas asked whether Ćaran would be interested in learning to make bombs and teaching others, apparently primarily for use in Europe but in this country as well. Ćaran assented. Several months later, Ćaran was telephoned at work by appellant Drago Sudar, who informed Caran he had been sent by Ljubas. After Ćaran picked up Sudar at the Croatian Center, the two men drove to Fairfield, Connecticut to purchase wires, a clock, a soldering iron, and gloves. From there they went to the apartment of a friend of Ćaran’s in Bridgeport, where Sudar taught Ćaran how to put together a time bomb.
27Ćaran’s lesson could not be completed, however, because the two men had been unable to purchase blasting caps in Fairfield. Several weeks later, Ljubas, who had come to the East Coast, offered to have blasting caps delivered to Ćaran (as well as arranging for Ćaran to be paid $2,000 to travel to Europe to pass on the skills he had acquired from Sudar). On July 5, 1980, Bagarić’s wife delivered to Ćaran, at the latter’s Bridgeport home, two blasting caps.
28In September, 1980, Sudar returned to Bridgeport to resume the bomb construction lessons. After detailing his recent trip to California to teach bombmaking to other Croatians (including the brother of Marijan Rudela), Sudar described to Ćaran “how to make bombs in the drawer, in the door, in the car, and in the book. In the book … is most dangerous, you got to be very, very careful to make a bomb.” Sudar demonstrated to Ćaran the preparation of time bombs.
29On June 25, 1981, Sudar was arrested at his home in Toronto, Canada, on an extradition warrant. Detectives of the Peel Regional Police Department searched his home, discovering and seizing a watch, batteries, light bulbs for automobile directional signals, tape, and coiled and color coded wires. One of the nine-volt batteries seized had its terminals filled with solder, in a manner similar to that used in the book bombs from the United Nations, Grand Central Terminal, and Logarusic’s home.
30The Indictment, Racketeering Counts and Trial
31By indictment S 81 Cr. 402, superseding and consolidating two earlier instruments and filed on June 30, 1981, Bagarić, Markich, Ljubas, Logarušić, Primorac, and Sudar were charged with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).8 Count One charged conspiracy to violate the racketeering statute, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1961, 1962(d), and Count Two alleged a substantive violation, id. Secs. 1961, 1962(c).9 On July 8, the United States Government filed with Canadian authorities an application for the extradition of Sudar, and on September 11, a warrant of committal was entered by a Canadian court, ordering Sudar’s extradition on Count One of S 81 Cr. 402 only. On July 28, a second superseding indictment, SS 81 Cr. 402, had named all appellants in the same two counts as S 81 Cr. 402. But, as Sudar had been formally extradited on S 81 Cr. 402, he could not be tried on SS 81 Cr. 402. Accordingly, on January 21, 1982, the district court ordered consolidation of the two indictments, Fed.R.Crim.P. 13; see United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 428-29 (2d Cir.1978).10
32Trial commenced on February 16, 1982, and continued for thirteen weeks. On May 15, after approximately six days of deliberations, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts against Ljubas, Markich, Primorac, and Bagarić. Sudar was convicted of the single conspiracy count on which he was tried. Logarusic was convicted of conspiracy and acquitted on the substantive offense. The district court sentenced Ljubas and Primorac to terms of imprisonment of twenty years on each count, to run consecutively. Markich and Bagaric received prison terms of twenty years under Count One and ten years under Count Two, such terms also to be served consecutively. Logarusic and Sudar were both sentenced to terms of imprisonment of twenty years on the conspiracy count. All convicted defendants have appealed, raising a multitude of contentions.
II 33The difficult threshold question posed for consideration is whether, in light of our recent decision in United States v. Ivić, supra, the conduct charged in the indictment and proved at trial constituted an offense under RICO. In Ivić, a panel of this court concluded that a prosecution may not properly be brought pursuant to Sec. 1962(c) when the Government does not charge that either the enterprise, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(4), or the predicate acts which make up the alleged pattern of racketeering activity, id. Sec. 1961(1), (5), possess some financial purpose. United States v. Ivić, supra, at 64. In this case the charges and proof all relate to a terrorist organization, “motivated”11 by political as well as economic goals, and claimed to have engaged in economic crimes “to obtain money to further [its] activities,” id. at 61 n. 6 (reserving issue of applicability of RICO to such cases). We are called upon to decide whether this case, falling somewhere between the complete absence of financial purpose or activity, on the one hand, and an enterprise engaged solely in siphoning monies from, and infiltrating, legitimate businesses, e.g., United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961, 101 S.Ct. 3109, 69 L.Ed.2d 971 (1981), on the other, is within the purview of RICO. For several reasons, we conclude it is.
34* Relying on isolated language in Ivić, appellants argue the Government is required to prove an ultimate and overriding financial motive to secure a RICO conviction. The Ivic court nowhere stated, however, that economic gain must be the sole motive of every RICO enterprise. Such a rule, we believe, would run counter to fundamental principles of criminal law and risk the politicization of criminal trials. We reject appellants’ contention.
35Although evidence of motives or purposes underlying criminal behavior is normally admissible, provided certain criteria of reliability are met, Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Houlihan, 332 F.2d 8, 15 (2d Cir.) (financial motive), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 828, 85 S.Ct. 56, 13 L.Ed.2d 37 (1964), motive itself is not generally an element of a particular offense. Compare United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11, 97 S.Ct. 22, 23, 50 L.Ed.2d 12 (1976), with United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111, 1119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 917, 95 S.Ct. 195, 42 L.Ed.2d 155 (1974). And, when Congress has required proof of motive, it has generally done so for behavior not deemed blameworthy absent the immoral motive, and not otherwise punishable. So, for example, it may be permissible under various circumstances to communicate with a judge to offer mitigating information relevant to sentence, e.g., United States v. Fasolino, 449 F.Supp. 586, 587 (W.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 586 F.2d 939 (2d Cir.1978), but “an endeavor to exploit” a friendship with the judge may be found to be a “corrupt” motive, 586 F.2d at 941 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503).
36RICO demands no such inquiry. The offenses it proscribes are, in the main, activities punishable irrespective of motives for performance, and accordingly they are provable by showing mens rea in the typical fashion. Hence, no additional scienter requirement is imposed by the statute. United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833, 101 S.Ct. 103, 66 L.Ed.2d 38 (1980). To carry out a deeper inquiry into long-term or ultimate motive would be to require adjudication of a factor traditionally deemed not exculpatory. E.g., United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 124 (3d Cir.1975) (Hobbs Act applies to extortions committed for religious “purposes”), aff’d sub nom. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977); United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 392 (7th Cir.1971) (Stevens, J.) (“Appellant’s professed unselfish motivation, rather than a justification, actually identifies a form of arrogance which organized society cannot tolerate.”). Moreover, such an exercise would embroil courts and jurors in a controversy essentially irrelevant to the purpose of the statute under consideration. Whether appellants extorted money for the long-term political purpose of effecting the separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia, whether this formed part, but not all, of their “motivation,” or whether the freedom of their former province is an issue they care about not at all, the effect of their activities on the national economy is identical. The Ivić court described RICO as a device to prevent (and reverse) “the drain[ing of] billions of dollars from America’s economy by unlawful conduct,” United States v. (Franjo, mo. Otporaš.) Ivić, supra, at 62. This effect is accomplished whatever considerations compel the creation and execution of an extortion scheme.
37RICO’s liberal construction provision, Pub.L. No. 91-452, Sec. 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947, was deemed irrelevant in Ivić, “since … construing RICO to cover terrorist activities … would in no way ‘effectuate its remedial purposes,’ ” id. at 65 n. 8, where there is no allegation or proof the enterprise’s “activities generate monies which can serve as a ‘springboard into the sphere of legitimate [business],’ ” id. at 63. In the case before us today, it is clear that, irrespective of the motive which appellants would have us believe spurred them to action, the remedial purposes of RICO are directly implicated. Pursuant to the direction of section 904(a), we decline to add an element of proof which would hamper the effective implementation of the statute.
38Further, investigation into motive would serve only to politicize, and otherwise inflame, RICO prosecutions. As discussed in greater detail infra, defense counsel sought to inject peripheral political and religious considerations into the trial of this case, implying that appellants’ anti-Communism or Catholicism, or their persecution by American and Yugoslavian officials acting in concert, justifiably drove them to commit the acts of extortion and violence charged in the indictment. These suggestions–which ultimately formed no part of the defense case of appellants who testified or presented witnesses–were, viewed charitably, misguided. They can only have served to patronize the jury and to add a distracting element of emotionalism to the proceedings.12 An interpretation of RICO requiring proof of long-term pecuniary objectives which in some sense can be said to supersede accompanying political or religious ones would invite a repetition of this conduct. It would authorize the admission of evidence of political beliefs, racial animosities, and family and blood feuds as justifications for criminal acts. Because we believe Congress, and the traditions of our criminal law, contemplate trials free of consideration of such issues, we reject appellants’ argument that economic motive must surmount all others.
B 39Appellants appear to argue also that the enterprise itself, rather than the predicate acts of racketeering, must be shown to yield financial gain. This contention is supported neither by a careful reading of the Ivić opinion nor by reference to the underlying purposes of RICO.
40The literal terms of the narrow Ivić holding require no more than an objective appraisal that some economic purpose was to be accomplished by the crime charged: “We hold that when an indictment does not charge that an enterprise or the predicate acts have any financial purpose, it does not state a crime under [RICO].” Id. at 65 (emphasis supplied). Additionally, this court has recognized that the nature of the misconduct often provides the best clue toward defining the enterprise. We have upheld application of RICO to situations where the enterprise was, in effect, no more than the sum of the predicate racketeering acts. United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 at 88-89 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 911, 101 S.Ct. 3142, 69 L.Ed.2d 994 (1981); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir.1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039, 97 S.Ct. 736, 50 L.Ed.2d 750 (1977). These decisions reflect the common sense recognition that a group of individuals may join together, and therefore be “associated in fact,” Sec. 1961(4), although not a legally cognizable entity in one of the traditional forms, id., solely for the purpose of conducting their activities. That is, it is logical to characterize any associative group in terms of what it does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure. See also United States v. Chovanec, 467 F.Supp. 41, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (enterprise need not be a group having characteristics of “organized crime,” since Congress enumerated acts “with no restrictions limiting [RICO] to persons with particular affiliations”); United States v. Vignola, 464 F.Supp. 1091, 1095-97 (E.D.Pa.) (same), aff’d without opinion, 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072, 100 S.Ct. 1015, 62 L.Ed.2d 753 (1980); cf. United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 885-86 (9th Cir.1970) (rejecting contention that “business enterprise,” 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952, reaches only “business[es] … associated with or controlled by a clandestine criminal organization”).
41Moreover, even where the enterprise is one of the legal entities listed in Sec. 1961(4), and proof of that element diverges from the proof of a pattern of racketeering, we think the requisite economic dimension may be demonstrated through the latter. Section 1961(4) appears to contemplate application of RICO to enterprises which, for example, are not themselves profit-making, or reinvest all their funds. Cf. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-81, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (in Sec. 1961(4), use of word “any” in clause dealing with unions and individuals associated in fact signals congressional intent to impose no restriction upon associations embraced by definition; illegitimate associations therefore included); United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 30-31 (2d Cir.1981) (New York City Civil Court held a RICO “enterprise;” use of word “any” indicates intent to make list all-inclusive, and “any being whose existence is recognized by law is within the term ‘enterprise’ “), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945, 102 S.Ct. 1442, 71 L.Ed.2d 657 (1982). The situation reached by Sec. 1962 may thus not always be one in which the enterprise “makes money” for its members. Yet, even absent a requirement that the enterprise be a profit-making one, the section implements the principal congressional purpose, “the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce,” S.Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969), in two significant ways. First, by “striking at the source of the problem,” United States v. Turkette, supra, 452 U.S. at 593, 101 S.Ct. at 2533, that is, proscribing the racketeering activities demonstrably capable of providing “a springboard into the sphere of legitimate enterprise[s],” id. at 591, 101 S.Ct. at 2533, whether “profit-making” or otherwise, Congress sought to make RICO preventive as well as remedial. Second, since non-profit corporations (as well as entirely illegitimate associations of individuals, see id. at 588-93, 101 S.Ct. at 2531-33; United States v. Mazzei, supra, at 88-90) compete within the economy for funds and services, it would have been counter-productive to exempt from the statute those invested in, acquired, or maintained through a pattern of racketeering activity.
42Accordingly, the Government may meet its obligation to show “financial purpose” through either the enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering.
43We recognize that, read in isolation, language in Ivic can be taken to support a requirement that, quite apart from the nature of the predicate acts, the enterprise itself must be “the sort of entity one joins to make money.” United States v. Ivic, supra, at 60. The court noted the usage of “enterprise” in other parts of Sec. 1962, concluded it referred to “the sort of entity in which funds can be invested and a property interest of some sort acquired,” id., and applied the same definition to subsection (c). Initially, we note this language is dictum, and differs from the holding of the case, which stated only that because neither the acts charged nor the purpose of the enterprise was economic, the indictment was outside the scope of Sec. 1962(c). More significantly, the context in which it was employed persuades us the panel had no intention of insisting the necessary showing of economic purpose be confined to the enterprise.
44Ivic involved a group of individuals associated in fact. That phrase is defined in the portion of Sec. 1961(4) designed to bring within Sec. 1962 the commission of criminal acts related, in any one of several ways, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(a), (b), (c), to enterprises with ascertainable associative structures but not one of those enumerated in the other part of Sec. 1961(4). See, e.g., United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir.1979) (group of corporations not legally related may be “group of individuals associated in fact;” otherwise “[o]ne could simply transfer assets from the corporation whose affairs had been conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity to another corporation whose affairs had up to that point not been so conducted”), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S.Ct. 1312, 63 L.Ed.2d 758 (1980). If the statute did not include this definition of enterprise, there might occur “the anomolous [sic] result that a large scale underworld operation which engaged solely in trafficking of heroin would not be subject to RICO’s enhanced sanctions, whereas small-time criminals jointly engaged in infrequent sales of contraband drugs and illegal handguns arguably could be prosecuted under RICO.” United States v. Mazzei, supra, at 89. And, as noted, we have sanctioned RICO prosecutions where the enterprise and the predicate acts of racketeering, although of course separate and necessary elements of Sec. 1962(c), need not be proved by distinct and independent proof. The Ivic panel’s consideration of the meaning of “enterprise” in subsections (a) and (b) therefore amounted to no more than support for its ultimate conclusion that economic purpose must be shown in either the proof of enterprise or the proof of predicate acts. In Ivic, the two were functionally equivalent, and “the proof used to establish [them] … coalesce[d],” United States v. Turkette, supra, 452 U.S. at 583, 101 S.Ct. at 2528. The problem for the Government was that no proof established (nor did the indictment allege) that the group’s “activities [were] designed to obtain, [or] in fact yield[ed], any money whatsoever.” United States v. Ivic, supra, at 63.13
C 45This case fits well within the principles we have enunciated. The core of the enterprise was the commission of more than fifty acts of the classic economic crime of extortion, and many of the violent crimes perpetrated were in aid of the extortion scheme. They were carried out either to compel payment or in retaliation for refusal to meet appellants’ extortionate demands. Indeed, the Assistant United States Attorney said in his opening statement to the jury that appellants sought to extort money from “moderate Croatians [to] help finance [their] criminal enterprise,” and emphasized that “this extortion scheme … is one of the centerpieces of this criminal case.” The first ten Government witnesses were extortion victims or widows of murdered extortion victims and proof of economic crimes continued throughout the lengthy trial.
46The indictment and proof in this prosecution were consistent with the language and purposes of RICO. We decline to impose upon the Government an obligation to show pure or ultimate economic motive in any of the various formulations urged by appellants. Although we have previously noted, United States v. Huber, supra, 603 F.2d at 395-96, and we repeat the admonition here, “that the potentially broad reach of RICO poses a danger of abuse [when the statute is] appl[ied] … to situations for which it was not primarily intended,” our obligation is “to rule on actual, as opposed to hypothetical, applications of the statute,” United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871, 101 S.Ct. 209, 66 L.Ed.2d 91 (1980), and it is clear to us that the present one was appropriate.
III 47Numerous claims unrelated to the Ivic issue have been advanced. We shall first consider those applicable to all appellants.
Prosecutorial Misconduct 48Alleging repeated and persistent instances of improper prosecutorial comment, appellants claim they were deprived of a fair trial. They challenge a number of statements as derogatory of defendants or their counsel, as injecting into the trial the prosecutor’s personal belief the defendants were lying, or as exceeding the appropriate bounds of cross-examination. Although appellants have fashioned a superficially impressive compilation of alleged misconduct, and although some remarks by the Government were perhaps ill-advised,14when read in the context of the entire record of this thirteen-week trial, United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 242, 60 S.Ct. 811, 853, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940); United States v. Bivona, 487 F.2d 443, 446-47 (2d Cir.1973); see United States v. White, supra, Y486 F.2d at 206 (prejudice less likely in “long and hotly contested trial”), the Government’s statements did not prejudice appellants’ right to a fair trial.
49The Assistant’s opening remarks to the jury were concise and free of rhetoric. Apart from a single remark that this case “is important … because the office [the prosecutors] represent is responsible for enforcing … federal laws,” into which appellants manage to read an appeal to the jury’s patriotism, the prosecutor adhered closely to the facts and indictment. He ended by asking the jury to
50approach your responsibilities as jurors in this case in the spirit of the utmost seriousness and fairness.
51… I urge you to listen carefully as the proof is presented in this case. Again, I remind you to be patient, that only one witness can testify at a time. I am confident that you are going to do that and I am equally confident that you are going to see that the defendants on trial here have a fair trial.
52In marked contrast, appellants’ counsel began, before a single witness had testified, to interject extraneous and potentially inflammatory considerations into the proceedings. Ljubas’s trial attorney, for example, told the jury that Ljubas was the victim of “the Communists and the Secret Police of Yugoslavia, which was trained by the Russian Secret Police;” “that attempts [on Ljubas’s life] were made by the Communist Secret Police known as UDBA, which is the Communist Secret Police of Yugoslavia that has agents throughout this country and in various Yugoslavian embassies throughout this country;” “that [Ljubas] was [in Rome in 1970] as a devout Catholic;” and that “[t]he first Croatian Saint was canonized by the Catholic Church in 1970 and there were many Croatians that went to Rome.” The Government’s witnesses, yet to testify, were characterized as “traitors, double agents, or Communist Secret Police, trying to infiltrate and destroy people in good standing.” This collection of statements reflects the substance of the entire opening, which takes up only five pages in the transcript.
53The second defense counsel, representing Markich, continued this approach. Markich was labelled a victim of the “Yugoslavian Police.” Counsel then implied the Government’s case served only to advance goals of the Yugoslavian Secret Police force:
54… You are going to hear how [Markich] is victimized. You are going to hear about the entire story, why he is here.
55Now, [Ljubas’s trial counsel] has told you about the Secret Police. That’s going to be part of this entire trial. It’s going to be part of it from the beginning to the end. You are going to hear it from the government’s own witnesses, about the Yugoslavian Police, and what they do and how they do it and how they get their goals, and the object of those individuals who are here or over there are to suppress the people who speak out for freedom. That is the greatest crime of Mr. Markic [sic].
56Counsel for Primorac ended his, also brief, opening with the following:
57I submit to you that [Primorac] https://otporas.com/remek-djelo-govor-ranka-primorca-prije-presude-na-sudu-u-new-york-u/ wasn’t part of any conspiracy or criminal enterprise of worldwide or local or of any import, but rather that he is himself a victim of political persecution, and unfortunately the evidence will show that the United States Government through the offices of [the two prosecutors] is being used to persecute this man, and this is being done by a foreign country, a communist country, if you will.
58Each of the remaining defense attorneys engaged in similar conduct, including references to political or religious persecution in Yugoslavia and the alleged victimization of their clients in this country. More than oblique hints were given that the United States Government was acting at the behest of officials in Belgrade:
59Somehow [Logarušić] has been put into the [prosecution], either by the government informant or by the government itself or God knows, and somebody said, by the secret police. And if you think that was made up, listen carefully to the evidence in this case, because more things go on in this heaven and earth than you would suspect, especially in a case that involves foreign countries and American foreign policy and our relationships with European countries and communist countries in 1982, in 1981, in 1980.
60Thus, from the first, defense counsel sought to put in question the legitimacy of this prosecution and the Government’s reasons for pursuing it, as well as presenting irrelevant and potentially prejudicial political and religious matters. We have repeatedly held that the Government is ordinarily permitted to respond to arguments impugning the integrity of its case, e.g., United States v. Miller, 478 F.2d 1315, 1318 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 851, 94 S.Ct. 144, 38 L.Ed.2d 100 (1973), and to “reply with rebutting language suitable to the occasion.” United States v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054, 1061 (2d Cir.1979) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860, 101 S.Ct. 162, 66 L.Ed.2d 76 (1980). We thus consider the specific categories of alleged prosecutorial conduct, mentioned above, as having occurred in the unfortunate context of appellants’ own making. United States v. LaSorsa, 480 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855, 94 S.Ct. 157, 38 L.Ed.2d 105 (1973).15
61The instances where the prosecutor is alleged unfairly to have engaged in name-calling or disparagement of defendants all constitute fair comment. For example, references to appellant Ljubas as a “man of peace” or “the Croatian Albert Schweitzer” were direct responses to defense counsel’s effort, on direct examination, to portray Ljubas as a religious figure whose sole diversions were participation in the affairs of his church and religious pilgrimages. The Government had a right to rebut this defense tactic, cf. United States v. Marrale, supra, 695 F.2d at 667 (“permissible desire to dispute defense histrionics”), and the use of rhetorical devices such as sarcasm was permissible, United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1181 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, — U.S. —-, 102 S.Ct. 2269, 73 L.Ed.2d 1284 (1982); DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 369 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.) (“To shear [the prosecutor] of all oratorical emphasis, while leaving wide latitude to the defense, is to load the scales of justice; it is to deny what has always been an accepted incident of jury trials, except in those jurisdictions where any serious execution of the criminal law has yielded to a ghostly phantom of the innocent man falsely convicted.”), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706, 45 S.Ct. 640, 69 L.Ed. 1168 (1925).16
62Similarly without merit is the contention the prosecutor relied on the prestige of his office to improperly vouch for the credibility of the Government’s case, or attack that of the defense. The long list of examples of alleged misbehavior is not only lifted from the cold record of an eleven-hour summation which comprises over three hundred transcript pages, see United States v. White, supra, 486 F.2d at 206, but it includes only one statement which arguably implied the existence of extraneous proof, or of a requirement that special credence be accorded the office of the United States Attorney, United States v. Modica, supra, 663 F.2d at 1179. All other arguments and characterizations were confined to the proof, and were “fairly based on record evidence.” United States v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565, 571 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059, 96 S.Ct. 796, 46 L.Ed.2d 650 (1976).
63The cross-examination techniques employed by the Assistant were also proper. Characterizations of Ljubas as “a man of peace” already have been discussed. And supposed attempts to compel defendants to rebut the veracity of the Government’s witnesses in fact amounted to no more than requests that they characterize testimony already in evidence, concerning events in which they were alleged to have participated, as accurate or inaccurate. Indeed, on direct examination, the same or similar questions were asked.
64In sum, although we believe the Government would have been better advised to avoid entirely the use of words and phrases such as “lie,” “preposterous,” “sham,” and “insulting to [the jury’s] intelligence,” but see United States v. Hysohion, 439 F.2d 274, 277-79 (2d Cir.1971), its conduct here was largely responsive to the prosecutor-baiting tactics chosen by appellants, and involved almost exclusively characterizations of record testimony rather than appeals to Government expertise or extrinsic, unutilized evidence. Viewed in context, the Government’s remarks constituted fair argument, and if errors were committed, they were neither significant nor did they prejudice appellants. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., supra, 310 U.S. at 239-40, 60 S.Ct. at 851-52. The jury’s discriminating acquittal of four defendants (and partial acquittal of Logarusic) demonstrates it was able to rely on the evidence adduced. United States v. White, supra, 486 F.2d at 207.
The Indictment 65Appellants contend the indictment was defective. They argue the pattern of racketeering failed to particularize the predicate acts in which each defendant was alleged to have been involved. This lack of specificity is claimed to have deprived appellants of notice of the charges against them and thereby to have thwarted effective trial preparation. This argument is without merit. An indictment need only track the language of the statute and, if necessary to apprise the defendant “of the nature of the accusation against him,” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1047, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962), state time and place in approximate terms. United States v. Salazar, 485 F.2d 1272, 1277 (2d Cir.1973
(To je verzija javnog tužitelja. Treba pročitati nekih desetak tisuća stranica sudskog zapisnika koje ja posjedum. Tu u tim sudskim zapisnicima je unakrsno ispitivanje državnih svjedoka s punim imuniteteom. Njih je bilo na tucete. Mogli su lagati a mnogi su po nalogu javnog tužitelja Stuart Baskina i lagali. Trebao bi se netko ozbiljno pozabaviti ovim slučajem njujorških procesa Hrvatima, knjigu ili knjige napisati. Tek bi se tada saznala prava istina, koristći se ovim sudskim zapisnicima i unakrsnim ispitivanjima gdje su odvjetnici obrane, njih 10 skoro svakog državnog svjedoka su uhvatili u mnogim lažima i krivim svjedočenjima. Tu u tom sudskom zapisniku bi se očito vidjelo kako su svi optuženi sa optužničke stolice svjedočili za Hrvatsku. To će biti najveće priznanje ovim Hrvatima i članovima Organizacije HNO da su se borili za ponovnu Obnovu Hrvatske Države. Mile Boban, Otporaš.) |
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